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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
 Oil may have put Texas on the map, but water is what it needs to stay there.2 
While other states struggled economically in recent years, Texas flourished.3  Since 1995, 
the number of jobs in Texas increased 31.5% as compared to the national average of just 
12%.4  The majority of the job growth occurred in Texas cities.5  In fact, four of 2013’s 
ten fastest growing cities are located in Texas.6  Although many industries expanded, the 
mining and logging sector, which includes the oil and natural gas industries, was notably 
strong.7  Population projections reflect the same growth trend. Texas’s population is 
forecasted to increase 80% in the next fifty years. This growth is predicated on access to 
water resources.8  The future of Texas is not definite; however, it is certain that none of 
this growth can continue without water.   
 
Groundwater is a critical component of Texas water resources.  Currently, 
groundwater accounts for 60% of all water withdrawn in the state.9  Historically, the 
largest groundwater user was the agricultural sector; however, Texas cities are also 
increasingly reliant on these water sources.10   State water demands are projected to 
increase 22% in the next fifty years.11  Many of these demands will be in the groundwater 
sector.  In addition to increasing demand, periodic and sometimes severe droughts 
                                                 
1  Assistant Professor, St. Mary’s University School of Law. Special thanks to Russ 
Johnson and Laura Burney for all their wisdom and patience and to Lindsay Riley for her 
painstaking attention to detail. 
2 Oil and Texas: A Cultural History, TEX. ST. HIST. ASS’N, 
http://www.texasalmanac.com/topics/business/oil-and-texas-cultural-history. 
3 Wendell Cox, The Texas Growth Machine, 23 CITY J. 1 (Winter 2013), available at 
http://www.city-journal.org/2013/23_1_texas-growth.html. 
4 Id. 
5 Id. 
6 Morgan Brennan, 10 Fastest-Growing U.S. Cities of 2013, http://realestate.msn.com/10-
fastest-growing-us-cities-of-2013. 
7Comptroller’s Weekly Economic Outlook, THE TEX. ECON. (Mar. 6, 2013), 
http://www.thetexaseconomy.org/economic-outlook/.  Those industries alone added an 
estimated 40,000 jobs.  Id. 
8 TEX. WATER DEV. BD., STATE WATER PLAN 1 (2012) [hereinafter STATE WATER PLAN]. 
9 Id. at 163. 
10 Id.; Water Use Survey Historical Summary Estimates By Region In Acre-Feet (2010), 
TEX. WATER DEV. BD., 
http://www.twdb.state.tx.us/waterplanning/waterusesurvey/estimates/2010/doc/2010state.
xlsl. 
11 STATE WATER PLAN, supra note 8, at 3, 129, 136. 
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challenge an already stressed system.12  Texas’s ability to provide sufficient resources 
depends in large part on their effective management.   
 
 The laws governing Texas groundwater have followed a long and complicated 
path consisting of case law and legislation.13  The common law of groundwater allocation 
was first established by the Texas Supreme Court in 1904, which held that Texas should 
follow the English common law right of capture.14  Under right of capture, one landowner 
can drain the water from under his neighbor’s property without liability with few 
exceptions.15  The court reasoned that this rule was preferable because of the scientific 
complications associated with trying to regulate groundwater and the impacts regulation 
may have on commerce.16   
 
Rule of capture has been upheld by subsequent cases; however, on several 
occasions the court has been critical of this allocation scheme and indicated that this rule 
should be changed by the legislature.17  Those opinions recognized the need for greater 
management based on changing circumstances in the state.18  Most notably, in Sipriano v. 
Great Spring Waters of America, Inc., the court went so far as to say that if the legislature 
did not change the law, the court would.19   
 
A state constitutional amendment vested the authority to manage and conserve 
natural resources with the legislature.20   Pursuant to this authority, the state created 
Groundwater Conservation Districts (GCDs) instead of forming a statewide regulatory 
agency.21   The state preferred districts because they provided a regional, bottom-up 
approach to planning that is more suitable for managing individual aquifers.  These 
legislatively created districts have the authority to permit groundwater wells based on 
well spacing to minimize interference between wells and set production limits based on 
tract size or production capacity.22  There are currently ninety-seven GCDs, but there are 
still areas of the state outside district authority.  In these areas, rule of capture continues 
unfettered.23  
 
                                                 
12 Jake Silverstein, Life by the Drop, TEX. MONTHLY, July 2012, at 101. 
13 See infra Parts III–VI. 
14 Houston & T. C. Ry. Co. v. East, 81 S.W. 279, 280–82 (Tex. 1904). 
15 Id. 
16 Id. at 281. 
17 See e.g., Sipriano v. Great Spring Waters of Am., Inc., 1 S.W.3d 75, 80 (Tex. 1999). 
18 Id. 
19 Id. 
20 TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 59(a). 
21 TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 36.0015 (West 2008). 
22 Act of May 27, 2001, 77th Leg., R.S., ch. 966, § 2.50, 2001 Tex. Gen. Laws 1991, 
2012–16 (amending TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 36.116). 
23 Groundwater, 45 Tex. Prac., Environmental Law § 14.2 (2d ed.). 
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Another significant regulatory initiative was the creation and expansion of the 
regional planning process.  Through two omnibus state water bills and other supporting 
legislation, state lawmakers created a statewide water-planning program.24  As part of this 
initiative, the state was divided into sixteen groundwater management areas (GMAs), 
which roughly parallel aquifer boundaries.25  These areas were then tasked with selecting 
desired future conditions for the aquifer, which is essentially a decision regarding the 
preferred aquifer conditions in fifty years.26  Based on that decision, individual GCDs 
within a GMA were tasked to permit water withdrawals to achieve that goal. 27  
Implementation of permitting rules to attain these future targets heralded a level of 
regulation that had never before occurred.   
 
Over the years, as capture was maintained by the courts and additional regulations 
were promulgated, questions began to arise regarding the specifics of the property right 
created by the common law rule.28  Although the court stated on multiple occasions that 
capture was the law, neither the court nor lawmakers ever specified if ownership in that 
water vested in place or upon capture.29  While the answer to this question did not have a 
significant impact when there was enough water for all users, the need for an answer 
increased as water supplies became scarcer.  The specific question of ownership was 
finally brought before the court in Edwards Aquifer Authority v. Day.  In its ruling, the 
Texas Supreme Court stated unequivocally that ownership rights vest in place.  Defining 
the right in place limits the extent to which districts can regulate groundwater before it 
becomes a regulatory takings.  Unfortunately for regulators, the court did not define 
where that limit is.   
 
The Day ruling was extremely controversial and led to many conversations about 
how much regulation was acceptable, but the ruling was compelling for another reason.  
The Day opinion denoted a departure from previous groundwater cases. 30   While 
previous cases criticized capture and deferred to legislative initiatives to regulate, often 
encouraging more limits, this decision did not.31  Instead, the opinion focused on oil and 
gas law and private property rights.32  This article seeks to explain this shift by evaluating 
the historic conversation between the Texas Supreme Court and the Texas Legislature on 
groundwater.  
                                                 
24 See infra Part IV.A–B. 
25 Groundwater Management Areas, TEX. WATER DEV. BD., 
http://www.twdb.state.tx.us/groundwater/management_areas/ (last visited Mar. 18, 2013). 
26 Robert E. Mace et al., A Streetcar Named Desired Future Conditions: The New 
Groundwater Availability for Texas (Revised), The Changing Face of Water Rights in 
Texas (State Bar of Tex. CLE 2008). 
27 Id. 
28 See infra Part VI.A–B. 
29 See infra Part VI.A–B. 
30 See infra Part VII. 
31 Edwards Aquifer Auth. v. Day, 369 S.W.3d 814, 831–32 (Tex. 2012). 
32 Id. 
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 This paper evaluates the Day decision through the lens of past court decisions and 
legislation in an effort to understand why the court ruled as it did.  Part II introduces 
Texas’s groundwater resources, current uses of that water, and present concerns 
regarding sustainability.33  Part III chronicles the line of cases that established capture as 
the common law rule in Texas.34  Part IV traces the history of groundwater legislation 
after courts established rule of capture.35  This legislation created a regulatory overlay on 
the common law rule of capture through localized groundwater conservation districts and 
the statewide planning process. 36   Part V describes the process through which the 
Edwards Aquifer Authority came into existence and why it is different from other 
groundwater districts in the state in that its strict pumping cap immediately raised 
property rights concerns.37  Part VI explains how groundwater litigation shifted from 
right of capture limitations to questions of when ownership vests.38  This change was a 
product of increased pressure on groundwater resources caused by additional regulations 
and growing population demands.39    
 
Finally, Part VII presents three hypotheses regarding why the court came to its 
decision in the Day case despite the case law history.40  The first theory is that delineation 
of property interests is an issue reserved for courts’ authority.41  Another alternative is 
that the holding in Day was a result of a statewide shift towards the protection of private 
property rights above other concerns.42  The final proposed alternative is that the Day 
holding was actually an effort to define the property right in such a way as to encourage 
more regulation or at least limit takings claims through the expansive of correlative rights 
to groundwater.43 
 
II. TEXAS GROUNDWATER 
  
Texans have a long-standing dependence on groundwater.44  Its usage has steadily 
increased throughout the state’s history.45  From early in the state’s history, farmers 
                                                 
33 See infra Part II. 
34 See infra Part III.A–B. 
35 See infra Part IV.A–B. 
36 See infra Part IV.A–B. 
37 See infra Part V.A–C. 
38 See infra Part VI.A–C 
39 See infra Part VI.A–C. 
40 See infra Part VII.A–C. 
41 See infra Part VII.A. 
42 See infra Part VII.B. 
43 See infra Part VII.C. 
44 Groundwater is defined by the Texas Water Code as “water percolating below the 
surface of the earth.”  TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 36.001(5) (West 2008).  This definition 
can be misleading, as underflow of a stream is actually considered surface water and 
therefore under state control.  Id. § 11.021(a).  Implementing regulations of Texas water 
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required groundwater for their livelihoods.  In the 1930s, groundwater was an essential 
tool in stopping the seemingly endless Dust Bowl in the Texas Panhandle and returning 
the area from a wasteland to a thriving agricultural economy.46  The majority of rivers 
that start in Central Texas and flow across the state to the bays and estuaries find their 
headwaters in groundwater-fed springs, without which the state could not provide 
sufficient surface water for many users.47  In addition, the seventh largest city in the 
United States, San Antonio, relies almost entirely on the Edwards Aquifer for its 
survival.48   
 
Texas has nine major aquifers and twenty-one minor aquifers. 49   In 2008, 
groundwater provided nearly 60% of the water used throughout the state. 50   This 
amounted to 9.66 million acre-feet per year.51  The vast majority, 80%, of this water was 
used for irrigation.52  35% of municipal demands are met by groundwater, although this 
percentage may increase in the future, as surface water is increasingly unavailable.53  
State water demands are projected to increase 22% in the next fifty years.54  Even with a 
projected decrease in irrigation demand, the demand for groundwater will continue to 
increase.55  This ever-growing, intensifying dependence on groundwater coupled with 
                                                                                                                                                 
rights supply additional details to the definition.  Groundwater is “water under the surface 
of the ground other than underflow of a stream and underground streams, whatever may 
be the geologic structure in which it is standing or moving.”  30 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 
297.1(21) (2012).  Once groundwater leaves the ground in the form of springs or 
discharges into a river, its legal character changes and it becomes surface water.  Denis v. 
Kickapoo Land Co., 771 S.W.2d 235, 236 (Tex. App.—Austin 1989, writ denied). 
45 PETER G. GEORGE ET AL., TEX. WATER DEV. BD. Report 380, AQUIFERS OF TEXAS 10 
(2011). 
46 Jon Mark Beilue, Methods Prevent Another Dust Bowl, AMARILLO GLOBE-NEWS, Apr. 
11, 2010. 
47 See GEORGE ET AL., supra note 45, at 27. 
48 Texas: San Antonio, San Antonio Protects Edwards Aquifer, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. 
AGENCY  (Jan. 2010), 
http://water.epa.gov/infrastructure/drinkingwater/sourcewater/protection/casestudies/uplo
ad/Source-Water-Case-Study-TX-SanAntonio.pdf.  
49 GEORGE ET AL., supra note 45, at 3. 
50 STATE WATER PLAN, supra note 8, at 163.  
51 An acre-foot is equal to 325,851 gallons of water. 
52 STATE WATER PLAN, supra note 8, at 163.  
53 Water Use Survey Historical Summary Estimates By Region In Acre-Feet, TEX. WATER 
DEV. BD. (2010), 
http://www.twdb.state.tx.us/waterplanning/waterusesurvey/estimates/2010/doc/2010state.
xlsl (last visited Mar. 18, 2013); STATE WATER PLAN, supra note 8, at 163.  Municipal 
uses accounted for fifteen percent of total groundwater withdrawals.  STATE WATER 
PLAN, supra note 8, at 163. 
54 STATE WATER PLAN, supra note 8, at 3, 129, 136. 
55 Id. at 3. 
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legal questions regarding regulation threatens the viability of many of these resources. 56  
Some of these impacts are already visible. 
 
While droughts are not new to Texas, additional stressors can turn a temporary 
inconvenience into a sustainability threat. 57   The state’s population is predicted to 
increase 82% between 2010 and 2060.58  The vast majority of these citizens will live in 
urban areas, stressing cities’ current water supplies. 59   New water supply plans for 
municipal areas often include desalination of brackish aquifers or pumping and long-haul 
transport of groundwater from one region of the state to another.60  In other areas, where 
drought and over-allocation have reduced surface water resources, some citizens have 
starting drilling personal groundwater wells. 61   Unfortunately, in regions where the 
groundwater is hydrologically connected to nearby surface water sources, withdrawal of 
the groundwater reduces the available surface water.62  These realities, viewed in light of 
climate change predictions for the region, paint a bleak picture and raise questions about 
how the state’s aquifers will survive.63 
 
The same region of Texas that suffered from the Dust Bowl is again under 
threat.64  The Ogallala Aquifer located in the Texas Panhandle experienced the largest 
one-year decline in twenty-five years.65  In 2011, Texas suffered a drought that exceeded 
                                                 
56 Id. at 164.  
57  Silverstein, supra note 12, at 101; Chris Tomlinson, Water Percolates Up Texas 
Legislature’s Agenda, http://lubbockonline.com/filed-online/2012-12-09/water-
percolates-texas-legislatures-agenda#.UMdiFJK3I3t (Dec. 9, 2012). 
58 STATE WATER PLAN, supra note 8, at 1. 
59 Id. at 3. 
60  Kate Galbraith, Industrial Evolution, TEX. MONTHLY 130 (July 2012) [hereinafter 
Industrial Evolution]; Kate Galbraith, Texas’ Water Woes Spark Interest in Desalination, 
THE TEX. TRIB., June 10, 2012 [hereinafter Water Woes]; STATE WATER PLAN, supra note 
8, at 193–95.  There are currently forty-four brackish water desalination plants in Texas 
used for public water supplies, and ten additional units have been approved for 
construction.  Water Woes, supra.  
61 Kate Galbraith, Texas Drought Sparks Water Well Drilling Frenzy, THE TEX. TRIB., 
Feb. 17, 2012. 
62  THOMAS C. WINTER ET AL., U.S GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, CIRCULAR 1139, GROUND 
WATER AND SURFACE WATER: A SINGULAR RESOURCE 2–5 (1998), available at 
http://pubs.usgs.gov/circ/circ1139/pdf/circ1139.pdf.  
63 Industrial Evolution, supra note 60, at 132. 
64 See Peter Miller, The New Dust Bowl, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC, Sept. 2012, at 58; Kate 
Galbraith, Drought Caused Big Drop in Texas Portion of Ogallala, THE TEX. TRIB., July 
3, 2012 [hereinafter Drought Caused Big Drop]. 
65 Drought Caused Big Drop, supra note 64.  Monitoring wells in the southern panhandle 
dropped an average of two and a half feet in just over a year.  Id.  Northernmost areas of 
the panhandle, near the Oklahoma border, measured almost a three-foot drop in water 
levels as the drought raged on.  Id.  Rainfall in Lubbock measured only 5.86 inches for 
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the dryness experienced in any single year during the severe drought of the fifties.66  The 
2011 drought greatly depleted surface and groundwater resources and wildfires raged 
throughout the state.67  Even before the 2011 drought, the Ogallala Aquifer was declining 
at an average of ¾ of a foot per year.68  Because the Ogallala is a non-recharging aquifer, 
these declines will eventually force a permanent shift in the High Plains economy unless 
considerable changes are implemented.69   
 
The Ogallala is not alone.  Recent monitoring of wells in aquifers across the state 
revealed significant water level declines ranging in severity from fifty feet to more than 
one thousand feet.70  Dewatering is not the only reason to limit pumping.  For example, 
access to water in the Gulf Coast Aquifer is restricted despite sufficient water availability 
because extraction created problematic subsidence.  In the next fifty years, available 
groundwater supplies are projected to decrease 30%, primarily due to the depletion of the 
Ogallala Aquifer and reduced supply from the Gulf Coast Aquifer as a result of 
mandatory subsidence reductions.71 
 
Despite these prognostics, many landowners remain opposed to increased 
groundwater regulation, seeing it as an invasion of private property rights. 72   To 
understand this seemingly illogical viewpoint, it is important to understand the evolution 
of water rights in Texas—any discussion of which must begin with the rule of capture 
established by the Texas Supreme Court in Houston & T. C. Railway Co. v. East.73  
 
III. ESTABLISHING THE RIGHT OF CAPTURE 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
2011.  Sandra Postel, That Sinking Feeling About Groundwater in Texas, NEWS WATCH, 
July 19, 2012.   
66  Silverstein, supra note 12, at 100; John Burnett, When the Sky Ran Dry, TEX. 
MONTHLY, July 2012, at 107 (chronicling the impact of the drought of the fifties on 
Texans).  The drought of the 1950s, which lasted from 1947 and 1957, is often referred to 
as the “drought of record” because it is the benchmark to which all other droughts in 
Texas are compared.  Farzad Mashhood, Current Drought Pales in Comparison with 
1950s “Drought of Record,” http://www.statesman.com/news/news/local/current-
drought-pales-in-comparison-with-1950s-d-1/nRdC5/; see STATE WATER PLAN, supra 
note 8, at 1. 
67  Craig Kanalley, Texas Wildfires 2011: Season Among Worst In State History, 
HUFFINGTON POST, Apr. 11, 2011.  
68 Kate Galbraith, Texas Farmers Battle Ogallala Pumping Limits, THE TEX. TRIB., Mar. 
18, 2012, [hereinafter Texas Farmers Battle]. 
69 Id. 
70 GEORGE ET AL., supra note 45, at 8; STATE WATER PLAN, supra note 8, at 8. 
71 STATE WATER PLAN, supra note 8, at 164. 
72 See e.g., Texas Farmers Battle, supra note 68 (describing farmers’ resentment towards 
the new rules promulgated by High Plains Underground Water Conservation District). 
73 See Houston & T. C. Ry. Co. v. East, 81 S.W. 279 (Tex. 1904). 
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 The legal road to groundwater in Texas is paved by a series of legal and 
legislative decisions made somewhat in tandem with, or at least in recognition of, one 
another.  When considered this way—viewing each court and legislative decision as one 
in a series—the progression in groundwater regulation becomes clearer.  Sometimes there 
appears to be a direct concert between the legislature and the judiciary, each one 
respecting and deferring to the other.  Other times, legislative deference is replaced with 
the subtleties of persuasion that courts often provide to legislators.74  While the common 
law clearly established the rule of capture, several subsequent decisions and a series of 
legislative efforts added asterisks to the court’s East decision and modified it.   
 
A. Starting with East 
 
Any discussion of groundwater law in Texas must begin with the Texas Supreme 
Court’s 1904 ruling in East.75  This case established the rule of capture as the law for 
Texas groundwater.76   
 
In East, the Houston Railroad Company had several lots upon which it built a 
large groundwater well and attached it to a steam pump.77  The pump withdrew 25,000 
gallons of water each day, which caused East’s much smaller, neighboring residential 
well to go dry.78  Despite East’s injury, the Texas Supreme Court held that Houston 
Railroad Company’s use was reasonable and not actionable.79  The court explained that 
the landowner has equal ownership of the soil and the water held therein.80  The court 
reached this conclusion for two reasons: first, the court stated that groundwater was too 
complicated to govern any other way; and second, requiring correlative rights would 
interfere with economic development.81  The only exception to this rule appeared to be 
that groundwater use must be absent evidence of malice or willful waste.82   
                                                 
74 See GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 164 (1982). 
75 See East, 81 S.W. at 279. 
76 Id. at 280–82. 
77 Id. at 280. 
78 Id. 
79 Id. at 281.  
80 Id.  “‘That the person who owns the surface may dig therein and apply all that is there 
found to his own purposes . . . and that if, in the exercise of such right, he intercepts or 
drains off the water collected from the underground springs in his neighbor’s well, this . . 
. falls within the description of damnum absque injuria, which cannot become the ground 
of an action.’”  Id. (quoting Acton v. Blundell, 12 Mees. & W. 324, 152 Eng. Rep. 1233 
(1843)). 
81 Id.  Correlative rights limit a landowner’s right to a resource, such as groundwater, to 
his or her reasonable share.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 10, 41, 4 (1979).  This 
share is often based on the amount of land owned by each on the surface.  Id.  The El 
Paso Court of Appeals specifically stated that correlative rights were not a part of Texas 
law and that the current rule of capture actually precludes its application.  Pecos Co. 
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East was a case of first impression for the court and Texas had no laws governing 
groundwater at the time of its disposition.  Without other guidance, the court relied on the 
experiences of other jurisdictions and English common law to reach its conclusion.83  In 
particular, the court cited Acton v. Lundell, a case that dated back to 1843.84  Despite its 
reliance on common law, the court posited that legislation would have guided its decision 
had the legislature previously created any regulations for groundwater.85  
 
Since 1904, many things in Texas have changed, including increased water 
demand and scarcity.  Some argued that the need for water created a conflict between the 
right of capture as outlined in East and lasting groundwater sustainability.  These 
concerns have resurfaced many times since the East decision.  In the years after the East 
decision, several cases involving groundwater trickled into Texas courts.  Although 
allocation regulatory regimes were not the primary question, the Texas Supreme Court 
confirmed that rule of capture was still the law.   
 
Texas Company v. Burkett involved a contract for the sale and transport of water 
from several sources, including groundwater.86  The focus of the opinion was on the 
validity of the contact; however, the court made clear that any percolating water would be 
the “exclusive property of the owner of the surface of the soil.”87  The court distinguished 
this property right from that created in surface water, which was only a right of use.88  
The transport of water was again the principal topic in City of Corpus Christi v. City of 
Pleasanton.89  This case concerned an effort to enjoin the Lower Nueces River Supply 
District and Corpus Christi from routing flow from an artesian well into a riverbed and 
transporting it over 118 miles to Corpus Christi.90  Plaintiff’s issue was the large amount 
of waste that occurred along the journey through evaporation, transpiration, and 
seepage. 91   Citing Acton and East, the court stated the surface owner has absolute 
ownership of the water held within, encumbered only by the common law limitations of 
waste and malicious intent.92  The court did not, however, endorse waste.  It simply stated 
that the determination of what constitutes waste was within the jurisdiction of the 
                                                                                                                                                 
Water Control & Imp. Dist. No. 1 v. Williams, 271 S.W.2d 503, 505–06 (Tex. Civ. 
App.—El Paso 1954, writ ref’d n.r.e.). 
82 East, 81 S.W. at 281–82. 
83 Id. 
84 Id. at 280–82 (citing Acton, 12 Mees. & W. 324, 152 Eng. Rep. 1233)). 
85 Id. at 280 (citing Frazier v. Brown, 12 Ohio St. 294 (1861)). 
86 Texas Co. v. Burkett, 296 S.W. 273, 273–74 (Tex. 1927). 
87 Id. at 278. 
88 Id. 
89 City of Corpus Christi v. City of Pleasanton, 276 S.W.2d 798, 799 (Tex. 1955). 
90 Id. at 799–800. 
91 Id.  Evidence showed that 63 to 74% of the water placed into the river for transport was 
lost through evaporation, transpiration, and seepage.  Id. at 800. 
92 Id. at 800–01. 
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legislature.93  In its more recent opinion in Friendswood Development Co. v. Smith-
Southwest Industries, Inc., the court again upheld the right of capture, but added 
subsidence caused by negligent groundwater removal as a limitation on permissible 
capture.94   
 
Although these cases indirectly confirmed the rule of capture, Texas courts did 
not directly address the question of whether the rule of capture should remain the law for 
groundwater for almost one hundred years after East.  Meanwhile, the state was growing 
along with its water needs, which continued to raise questions and concerns about the 
wisdom of this common law doctrine.   
 
B. Capturing Sipriano 
 
In 1999, the Texas Supreme Court had its first modern opportunity to directly 
confront the question of whether the rule of capture remained the appropriate method of 
groundwater allocation for Texas.95  In Sipriano v. Great Spring Waters of America, the 
defendant, Ozarka Natural Spring Water, began pumping nearly 90,000 gallons of 
groundwater every day for bottling and sale.96  The pumping quickly depleted Sipriano’s 
nearby wells.97  Among other requests, Sipriano asked the court to abandon the rule of 
capture and replace it with the rule of reasonable use.98  The court refused to do so.  
Deferring to its ruling in East, the court maintained the rule of capture as the law in 
Texas.99 
 
 Although the court upheld East, its opinion indicated that capture may not be 
appropriate in the future or even at the time of the opinion.100  The court relied heavily on 
                                                 
93 Id. 
94 Friendswood Dev. Co. v. Smith-Sw. Indus., Inc., 576 S.W.2d 21, 22, 25–26 (Tex. 
1978). 
95 Sipriano v. Great Spring Waters of Am., Inc., 1 S.W.3d 75 (Tex. 1999). 
96 Id. at 75–76. 
97 Id. at 76. 
98 Id. 
99 Id. at 75. 
100 Id.  Other states faced with the same question decided to overrule capture.  See e.g., 
Lawrence J. Wolfe & Jennifer G. Hager, Wyoming’s Groundwater Laws: Quantity and 
Quality Regulation, 24 LAND & WATER L. REV. 39, 42–45 (1989).  In Wyoming, like in 
Texas, the state supreme court first adopted rule of capture near the turn of the century 
when pumping was minimal.  Hunt v. City of Laramie, 181 P. 137 (Wyo. 1919).  
However, within a couple of decades, rapidly increasing groundwater use for irrigation 
raised questions regarding the wisdom of capture.  Wolfe & Hager, supra, at 43.  In the 
early 1940s, the state engineer urged the legislature to replace capture with prior 
appropriation, which the state did for the first time in 1947, adding more details in 1957. 
Wolfe & Hager, supra, at 43–45. 
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legislative deference to avoid deviation from the common law. 101   Citing several 
legislative initiatives pertaining to groundwater, the court made it clear that the capitol 
should be the source of any changes to allocation principles.102  Specifically, the court 
deferred heavily to the recently passed Senate Bill 1’s (SB 1) initiative to increase the 
authority of groundwater districts.103  The ruling did not endorse the wisdom of the rule 
of capture.  Instead, the court stated such a decision was not within the court’s 
authority—not yet at least. 104  Throughout the opinion, the court qualified its ruling by 
stating that, while it was not appropriate for the court to take action on right of capture “at 
this time,” it was not outside the court’s bounds to do so at a later date, should the 
circumstances necessitate it.105  
 
Courts often change the rule of law in response to changed circumstances.106  In 
Sipriano, the court acknowledged this practice, stating, “We do not shy away from 
change when it is appropriate.” 107   The court recognized that one of the primary 
conditions upon which it relied in East was no longer present.108  In particular, the court 
rejected East’s characterization of groundwater as “occult” and thus unable to be 
regulated.109  Moreover, the court specifically stated that facts such as those presented in 
Sipriano provided compelling reasons to regulate groundwater.110  Still, no change was 
made. 
 
Some of the strongest language against the wisdom of maintaining capture came 
from Justice Hecht’s concurrence.  Justice Hecht stated that “[w]hat really hampers 
groundwater management is the established alternative, the common law rule of capture, 
which entitles a landowner to withdraw an unlimited amount of groundwater.”111  He 
further noted that all of the western states cited in East that followed the rule of capture 
replaced the rule with other regimes.112  He pointed to oil and gas law to debunk the 
                                                 
101 Sipriano, 1 S.W.3d at 76–83. 
102  Id. at 79–80; see discussion infra Part IV.A.  The court also cited the 1917 
constitutional amendment tasking the legislature with the responsibility of resource 
management.  Sipriano, 1 S.W.3d at 79–80; see discussion infra Part IV. 
103 Sipriano, 1 S.W.3d at 79–80. 
104 Id. 
105 Id. at 75, 80–81. 
106  CALABRESI, supra note 74, at 166 (“[T]he judicial common law would attach to 
statutory rules that are out of phase just as much as to common law precedents or 
doctrines.”). 
107 Sipriano, 1 S.W.3d at 80. 
108 Id. at 77 (citing City of Corpus Christi v. City of Pleasanton, 276 S.W.2d 798, 801 
(Tex. 1955)). 
109 Id. at 80. 
110 Id. (Hecht, J., concurring). 
111 Id. at 81. 
112 Id. at 81–82. 
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concept that underground materials cannot be effectively regulated, and went on to say 
that it is “not regulation that threatens progress, but the lack of it.”113   
 
Justice Hecht stated that the parties did not put forth any effective reason to 
maintain capture as the preferred method of management.114  Simply arguing that capture 
has been the rule for many years, or that change would be disruptive, was not an 
acceptable rationale. 115   Reviewing the Second Restatement of Torts, Justice Hecht 
explained that, “[w]hile neither [the Restatement] nor any other common law rule of 
water regulation is preferable to almost any legislative solution, absent a solution, [the 
Restatement] is preferable to the rule of capture.”116  Despite this strong language, Justice 
Hecht remained with the majority in maintaining East “for now” to provide SB 1, and its 
efforts to empower district regulations, time to play out.117  As the case law pertaining to 
the common law rule of capture continued to develop, so did legislative regulations.   
 
IV. THE LEGISLATURE SPEAKS 
 
While Texas courts consistently upheld the rule of capture, the legislature was 
simultaneously limiting groundwater rights through regulation.  This began just six years 
after the Texas Supreme Court’s decision in East, when the droughts of 1910 and 1917 
motivated the legislature to amend the state constitution to explicitly extend the 
legislature’s obligations to include the duty to protect the state’s natural resources.118  
This amendment was not self-enacting, but, through its passage, the duty to implement 
public policy relating to groundwater was placed squarely with the legislature.119   
 
Unlike surface water, groundwater was not enumerated as a natural resource in 
the article, but the article did contain a general reference to water under which 
groundwater would likely be included.120  Courts have cited this amendment to support 
the argument that the judiciary is not the appropriate authority to implement laws limiting 
groundwater production.121  However, because the amendment passed after East, the 
court had already established a common law regulation.  A common law rule of capture 
evolving contemporaneously with a regulatory structure seeking to regulate groundwater 
                                                 
113 Id. at 82. 
114 Id. 
115 Id.  
116 Id.  
117 Id. at 83; see discussion infra Part IV.A. 
118 Sipriano, 1 S.W.3d at 77; see TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 59(a).  “The conservation and 
development of all of the natural resources of this State . . . and the preservation and 
conservation of all such natural resources of the State are each and all hereby declared 
public rights and duties; and the Legislature shall pass all such laws as may be 
appropriate thereto.”  TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 59(a). 
119 TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 59(a). 
120 Id.  
121 See e.g., Sipriano, 1 S.W.3d at 79–80.   
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rights created bifurcated system that continues to create confusion regarding how far the 
legislature can go in limiting the common law right.   
 
Potential conflicts aside, the legislature took on the responsibility of governing 
groundwater primarily through Groundwater Conservation Districts (GCDs).  A GCD’s 
purpose is “to provide for the conservation, preservation, protection, recharging, and 
prevention of waste of groundwater, and of groundwater reservoirs or their subdivisions, 
and to control subsidence caused by withdrawal of water from those groundwater 
reservoirs or their subdivisions, consistent with the objectives of Section 59, Article XVI, 
[of the] Texas Constitution.”122  Texas’s legislature first provided for GCDs in 1949 
pursuant to the constitutional authority it received through the conservation 
amendment.123  
 
Districts are the preferred method of groundwater management because they 
authorize local control by those most familiar with the resource and most affected by any 
regulation. 124   Subsequent regulations have increased the authority of GCDs and 
strengthened the state’s regional planning process.  This has led to increased pumping 
limits in some areas.  In other special circumstances, such as in the Edwards Aquifer, a 
firm-pumping cap was established.125   
 
A. The Growth of Districts 
 
 The Article 59 amendment authorized the creation of GCDs in 1917; however, by 
1996, only thirty-four districts were created.126  Although water issues would commonly 
surface after dry years, the state had enough resources to meet most needs, which avoided 
the demand for additional districts or statewide regulation.  The lack of districts changed 
                                                 
122 TEX. WATER CODE ANN.  § 36.0015 (West 2008). 
123 Sipriano, 1 S.W.3d at 79.  “There may be created within the State of Texas, or the 
State may be divided into, such number of conservation and reclamation districts as may 
be determined to be essential to the accomplishment of the purposes of this amendment to 
the constitution, which districts shall be governmental agencies and bodies politic and 
corporate with such powers of government and with the authority to exercise such rights, 
privileges and functions concerning the subject matter of this amendment as may be 
conferred by law.”  TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 59(b).   
124  Groundwater Management Through Groundwater Conservation Districts, TEX. 
WATER DEV. BD., 
http://www.twdb.state.tx.us/publications/reports/numbered_reports/doc/R365/ch-
20%20TAGD%20bro.pdf (last visited Mar. 18, 2013). 
125 See discussion infra Part IV.C.2. 
126 Groundwater Conservation Districts, TEX. WATER DEV. BD. (Jan. 2013), 
http://www.twdb.state.tx.us/mapping/doc/maps/gcd_only_8x11.pdf (last visited Mar. 18, 
2013). 
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in 1997 with Texas’s first historic omnibus water bill: SB 1.127  SB 1 marked the first 
attempt to shift from water development to statewide regional planning.128  As with most 
water legislation in Texas, SB 1 came on the heels of a three-year drought.129  That harsh 
reality, coupled with Texas’s growth rate projections and a realization that the state water 
plan was not being properly implemented, created a leadership moment in Texas water 
history in which the legislature sought to invigorate the planning process and provide 
more effective management.130 
 
Although SB 1 dealt with a host of water issues, it had profound consequences on 
groundwater.  Prior to its passage, groundwater management did not exist in many areas 
of the state except for the few locations where GCDs existed.  SB 1 sought to change this 
and explicitly stated that “[g]roundwater conservation districts . . . are the state’s 
preferred method of groundwater management.”131  GCDs “embody a central premise of 
this legislation—local control—and represent the idea that those closest to the resource 
are those most capable of managing it.”132  After SB 1, the number of groundwater 
districts grew quickly.133  
 
In addition to its goal of expanding the regulatory power of individual districts, 
SB 1 sought to treat the state as a whole and set up a system of regional planning groups, 
                                                 
127 See Act of June 1, 1997, 75th Leg., R.S., ch. 1010, 1997 Tex. Gen. Laws 3610 
(codified in various sections of TEX. WATER CODE ANN.).  There have been three 
omnibus water bills: Senate Bills 1, 2, and 3.  See id.; Act of May 27, 2001, 77th Leg., 
R.S., ch. 966, 2001 Tex. Gen. Laws 1991; Acts 2007, 80th Leg., R.S., ch. 1430, 2007 
Tex. Gen. Laws 5848. 
128  Chris Lehman, Hung Out to Dry?: Groundwater Conservation Districts and the 
Continuing Battle to Save Texas’s Most Precious Resource, 35 TEX. TECH L. REV. 101, 
107 (2004).  State planning, as defined by SB 1, included dividing the state into sixteen 
regional planning groups, separate and apart from the groundwater management areas, 
for the purposes of forecasting and management of both surface water and groundwater 
resources for inclusion in the State Water Plan.  Water for Texas: Regional Water 
Planning in Texas, TEX. WATER DEV. BD. (Jan. 2013), 
http://www.twdb.texas.gov/publications/shells/RegionalWaterPlanning.pdf (last visited 
Mar. 18, 2013).  This article focuses solely on the groundwater portion of the planning 
process.   
129 Martin Hubert & Bob Bullock, Senate Bill 1, The First Big and Bold Step Toward 
Meeting Texas’s Future Water Needs, 30 TEX. TECH L. REV. 53, 55 (1999). 
130 Id. at 55–56.  SB 1 passed just two years before the Texas Supreme Court’s decision 
in Sipriano, and is the primary recipient of legislative deference in the court’s opinion.  
See discussion supra Part III.B. 
131 Act of June 1, 1997, § 4.21, 1997 Tex. Gen. Laws at 3642–43 (codified in TEX. 
WATER CODE ANN. § 36.0015 (West 2008)). 
132 Hubert & Bullock, supra note 129, at 66. 
133 Lehman, supra note 128, at 104. 
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which looked at both surface and groundwater resources.134  The bill directed these areas 
to examine water resources, needs, and projections.135  Each regional planning group was 
required to consider all of the included GCDs’ management plans.136  Additionally, SB 1 
provided for data collection to close data gaps, which had previously made planning 
difficult, if not impossible.137  The bill also created Priority Groundwater Management 
Areas (PGMAs). 138   PGMAs are areas identified as potentially having significant 
problems within twenty-five years of the bill passing.139   
 
SB 1 consolidated the laws governing GCDs into Chapter 36 of the Texas Water 
Code.140  This chapter provides for the creation of GCDs, means of governance, powers, 
and duties.141  In addition to emphasizing a preference for GCDs, the bill increased their 
statutory authority to manage withdrawals.142  The bill also provided extensive guidance 
for the creation of management plans.143  Perhaps most importantly, the bill required 
landowners to obtain permits for any newly drilled water wells.144  Permit applications 
required users to report their use and submit statements of purpose when applying for 
well permits. 145   Districts could also issue or deny permits for out-of-basin water 
                                                 
134 See Act of June 1, 1997, § 1.02, 1997 Tex. Gen. Laws at 3611–14 (codified in TEX. 
WATER CODE ANN. § 16.053). 
135 Id. 
136 Id. 
137 Id. § 1.05, 1997 Tex. Gen. Laws at 3610, 3617 (amending TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 
15.404). 
138 Id. § 4.11, 1997 Tex. Gen. Laws at 3636 (amending TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 
35.007(a)). 
139 Id.  
140 Russell Johnson, Groundwater Law and Regulation, in ESSENTIALS OF TEXAS WATER 
RESOURCES 113 (Mary K. Sahs ed. 2009).   
141 See TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 36.0001 et. seq.  Although districts can be formed 
several ways, the most common is through legislative action.  Johnson, supra note 140, at 
114. 
142 Act of June 1, 1997, § 4.21 et. seq., 1997 Tex. Gen. Laws at 3642–43 (codified in 
various sections of TEX. WATER CODE ANN.). 
143 Id. § 4.28, 1997 Tex. Gen. Laws at 3644 (codified in TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 
36.1071). 
144 Id. § 4.30, 1997 Tex. Gen. Laws at 3646–47 (amending TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 
36.113).  Districts were given permission to exempt certain types of wells from obtaining 
a permit.  Id. § 4.32, 1997 Tex. Gen. Laws at 3647–48 (amending TEX. WATER CODE 
ANN. § 36.117).  These included domestic and livestock wells and wells used for 
hydrocarbon production, among others.  Id. (amending TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 
36.117(1)(3)). 
145 Id. § 4.30, 1997 Tex. Gen. Laws at 3646–47 (codified in TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 
36.1071(c)(3)). 
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transfers.146  Overall, the purpose of SB 1 was to implement groundwater management 
where previously absent, but the bill did not attempt to change the common law regarding 
statewide groundwater allocation.  
 
Although SB 1 did not change the rule of capture, commentary suggests it did not 
endorse it either.  A law review, coauthored by the bill’s champion, Lt. Governor Bob 
Bullock, stated:  
 
Early in the process, the sponsors of the bill decided that the timing was 
not right for considering such provisions and that groundwater districts 
were the appropriate entity to manage the resource.  However, as urban 
and industrial water demand continues to grow, these users will be looking 
for alternate sources of water to satisfy their needs.  When this happens, 
and property owners are faced with the prospect of a large water pumper 
depleting their groundwater supplies, property owners may begin 
considering additional ways to protect their right to use the 
groundwater.147   
 
This sentiment is particularly striking considering groundwater’s precarious status 
seventeen years later coupled with the continued presence of capture. 
 
 The legislature did not replace the rule of capture, but groundwater legislation 
limiting its reach continued to evolve.  SB 1 was followed by another omnibus water bill 
in 2001: Senate Bill 2 (SB 2).148  SB 2 was intended to update and fortify the initiatives 
commenced in SB 1.149  “The legislation also reflected a continuation of disputes that 
arose in the 1999 session about the establishment of single-county groundwater districts 
and a growing interest in the issue of transporting groundwater outside district boundaries 
to provide water for thirsty cities.”150  As with many water issues, SB 2 was contentious 
and required extensive negotiations to gain passage.151 
 
 The bill enhanced the regulatory powers of GCDs by expanding their permitting 
and enforcement powers.152  Most importantly, the bill provided for increased regulation 
                                                 
146 Id. § 4.33, 1997 Tex. Gen. Laws at 3648–49 (codified in TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 
36.112). 
147 Hubert & Bullock, supra note 129, at 66. 
148 Act of May 27, 2001, 77th Leg., R.S., ch. 966, 2001 Tex. Gen. Laws 1991. 
149 Lehman, supra note 128, at 110. 
150 Ken Kramer, Senate Bill 2—Omnibus Water Legislation, SIERRA CLUB, 
http://texas.sierraclub.org/texaslegislature/EIS/sb2.html (last visited Mar. 18, 2013). 
151 Gregory M. Ellis & Jace A. Houston, Senate Bill 2: ‘Step Two’ Towards Effective 
Water Resource Management and Development for Texas, 32 ST. B. TEX. ENVTL. L.J.  
53, 53 (2002). 
152 See Act of May 27, 2001, 77th Leg., R.S., ch. 966, 2001 Tex. Gen. Laws 1991. 
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of well spacing to minimize interference between wells.153  Districts were also allowed to 
set production limits based on tract size or production capacity by dictating acre-feet per 
acre or gallons per minute.154   These terms were a direct response to the Seventh Court 
of Appeals’s decision in South Plains LaMesa Railroad, Ltd. v. High Plains 
Underground Water Conservation District No. 1, in which the court held that Chapter 36 
did not give districts the authority to deny a permit based on tract size.155 
 
While allowing increased regulations in many ways, SB 2 also did the opposite by 
prohibiting a district from rejecting a proposed permit specifically for exportation of 
groundwater out of the district.156  In exchange, the district received the ability to levy an 
export fee on that water.157  The bill also streamlined the process for designation of 
GMAs and PGMAs, which were originally described in SB 1, and set deadlines for their 
designations.158  Although districts are generally restricted from purchasing groundwater 
rights, they could do so for conservation purposes if the rights were permanently held in 
trust.159 
 
One existing issue that was compounded after SB 1 was the amount of districts 
overlaying the same aquifer.160  This created a potential source of conflict and confusion 
because each district could create opposing management plans for essentially the same 
water.  SB 2 sought to remedy this by establishing procedures for joint management of 
the shared aquifer by groundwater districts.161  
 
Perhaps foreseeing future conflicts between the established common law created 
by the courts and the increasing power given to groundwater districts by the legislature, 
SB 2 attempted to clarify the relationship.  The bill amended the statute codifying 
groundwater ownership and added that ownership rights “may be limited or altered by” 
                                                 
153 Id. § 2.50, 2001 Tex. Gen. Laws at 2015–16 (amending TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 
36.116). 
154 Id.   
155 See South Plains LaMesa R.R., Ltd. v. High Plains Underground Water Conservation 
Dist. 1, 52 S.W.3d 770, 778–79 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2001, no pet. h.). 
156 Act of May 27, 2001, § 2.52, 2001 Tex. Gen. Laws at 1991, 2018 
157 Id. § 2.52, 2001 Tex. Gen. Laws at 2018–19 (amending TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 
36.122). 
158 Id. § 2.22, 2001 Tex. Gen. Laws at 2003–04 (amending TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 
36.004). 
159 Id. § 2.54, 2001 Tex. Gen. Laws at 2020 (amending TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 
36.206).  One of the enforcement mechanisms that was added was the ability to levy civil 
penalties for breach of district rules.  Id. § 2.45, 2001 Tex. Gen. Laws at 2012 (amending 
TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 36.102). 
160 Compare Groundwater Conservation Districts, supra note 126, with GEORGE ET AL., 
supra note 45, at 27. 
161 Act of May 27, 2001, § 2.48, 2001 Tex. Gen. Laws at 2013–15 (amending TEX. 
WATER CODE ANN. § 36.108). 
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district rules.162 Like the inclusion of tract specific considerations for permitting, this 
modification was a response to the South Plains case.163  In its South Plains opinion, the 
court stated that district permitting rules could contravene the common law rule of 
capture.164  The legislature wanted to clarify that the rule of capture could be limited by 
district rules.  Unfortunately, the language added by SB 2 drafters was not sufficient to 
circumvent future conflict between property owners and regulatory management.  This 
became particularly apparent with the continued development of the groundwater 
planning process. 
 
B. GCDs and the Groundwater Planning Process 
 
The number of districts grew quickly after the passage of SB 1.165  Currently, 
there are ninety-seven confirmed districts and three additional districts pending.166  “Over 
half of the total land areas of Texas is within a groundwater conservation district . . . and 
almost ninety percent of groundwater produced in Texas comes from counties with such 
a district.”167  
 
SB 1 and SB 2 gave GCDs broad regulatory authority.  As mentioned, a GCD can 
create a permitting system or promulgate other rules to  
limit[] groundwater production based on tract size or spacing of wells, to 
provide for conserving, preserving, protecting, and recharging of the 
groundwater or of a groundwater reservoir or its subdivisions in order to 
control subsidence, prevent degradation of water quality, or prevent waste 
of groundwater.168   
Unless it falls into a recognized exemption, a well located in a GCD cannot be drilled or 
completed without a permit.169  Examples of rules that individual GCDs have passed 
include requiring the installation of well meters and mandatory reporting of pumping 
quantities.170  
 
                                                 
162 Id. § 2.31, 2001 Tex. Gen. Laws at 2009 (amending TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 
36.002). 
163 Ellis & Houston, supra note 151, at 56; see South Plains LaMesa R.R., Ltd. v. High 
Plains Underground Water Conservation Dist. 1, 52 S.W.3d 770 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 
2001, no pet. h.). 
164 See South Plains LaMesa R.R., Ltd., 52 S.W.3d at 779. 
165 Lehman, supra note 128, at 104. 
166 Groundwater Conservation Districts, supra note 126. 
167 Groundwater, 45 Tex. Prac., Environmental Law § 14.2 (2d ed.). 
168 TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 36.101 (West 2008).  
169 Id. §§ 36.113, 36.1131.  Although exempt wells do not require a permit, a GCD can 
require landowner to register an exempt well with the district.  Id. § 36.117(h)(1), (2). 
170 See e.g., District Rules, HIGH PLAINS WATER DIST., http://www.hpwd.com/rules-and-
management-plan/district-rules/ (last visited Mar. 18, 2013). 
 20
Even with the proliferation of GCDs after SB 1 and their increased permitting 
authority imparted by SB 2, there was little immediate conflict between regulators and 
users regarding a perceived invasion of property rights.  This tension began to increase, 
however, when the regional planning process brought harbingers of greater regulation, 
which could affect an unfettered property right in water.  This regulatory process, 
combined with a steady increase in demand, created the perfect storm between owners 
and regulators.     
 
The regional planning process as it stands today evolved through a series of 
legislative efforts, each subsequently responding to deficiencies or challenges that arose.  
GCDs were first required to create comprehensive management plans in 1989; however, 
there was no interface with other districts or the region as a whole.171  SB 1 was the first 
effort to evaluate statewide water supply needs and consider how those needs could be 
met by introducing regional planning.172  In addition to creating the process, the bill 
required certain information be included in all groundwater management plans to ensure 
uniformity.173  Currently, all plans must specify objectives and performance standards, 
and must include detailed procedures that demonstrate how the goals of the plan will be 
achieved.174 
 
In addition to GCDs, GMAs have existed since the 1950s.175  A GMA is defined 
as an area suitable for the management of groundwater resources.176  Although they now 
play a large role in statewide planning, before 2001, their primary purpose was to enable 
the creation of GCDs by petition.177  SB 2 repurposed the management areas as planning 
tools.  The bill required the Texas Water Development Board (TWDB) to designate 
GMAs to include all major and minor aquifers within two years of the bills effective 
date.178  The TWDB was directed to use aquifer boundaries or subdivisions of aquifer 
boundaries to establish GMA boundaries.179  This is very different than the construct of 
most GCDs, which usually follow political boundaries such as county borders.180  The 
                                                 
171 Mace et al., supra note 26, at 1. 
172 Hubert & Bullock, supra note 129, at 54.  
173 Id. at 57.  
174 See TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 36.1071(e). 
175 Mace et al., supra note 26, at 1.  The name “groundwater management area” has 
changed over the years, but will be referred to throughout with this current moniker.  Id. 
176 TEX. WATER CODE ANN. §35.002(11). 
177 Act of May 19, 1949, 51st Leg., R.S., ch. 306, 1949 Tex. Gen. Laws 559; Mace et al., 
supra note 26, at 1.   
178 Act of May 27, 2001, 77th Leg., R.S., ch. 966, § 2.22, 2001 Tex. Gen. Laws 1991, 
2003 (amending TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 36.004).  Designating GMAs was originally 
tasked to the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality (formerly Texas Natural 
Resource Conservation Commission).  Id.   
179 Id. 
180 See Groundwater Conservation Districts, supra note 126. 
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purpose of GMAs was to create administrative boundaries.  Planning within a GMA is 
done by the GCDs. 
 
There are currently sixteen GMAs in Texas.181  Within the GMAs are varying 
numbers of GCDs.182  SB 2 commenced the process of linking a GCD’s planning with all 
other GCDs in a GMA.183  Recognizing the potential for conflict among GCDs regarding 
the appropriate management of groundwater, the bill directed GCDs within the same 
GMA to share their groundwater management plans with each other. 184   A GCD’s 
management to preserve historical or existing use must be consistent with its 
comprehensive management plan. 185  A district in the area could also call for joint 
planning; however, it was not required.186   
 
Policymakers have also attempted to link regional and district planning with the 
statewide plan.  For example, SB 2 created additional consideration requirements in the 
regional water plans, including impacts of the plan on unique river or stream segments on 
water quality.187  Also, the TWDB would approve regional water plans only if the plans 
included water conservation practices and drought management measures and were 
consistent with the long-term protection of the state’s water, agricultural, and natural 
resources embodied in the guidance principles for the state plan.188   
 
Although SB 1 and SB 2 contemplated an integrated planning process, they did 
not require it.  It was not until 2005 that the planning process really took shape with the 
passage of House Bill 1763 (HB 1763).189  HB 1763 made three major changes to the 
planning process.  First, it regionalized decisions on groundwater availability.190  Second, 
it required statewide regional planning groups to use availability numbers generated from 
                                                 
181Groundwater Management Areas, supra note 25.  By 2001, predecessor agencies had 
designated nineteen groundwater management areas, which were dissolved when TWDB 
adopted the current scheme of management areas covering the whole state.   Mace et al., 
supra note 26, at n.10. 
182 See Groundwater Conservation Districts, supra note 126.  
183 Act of May 27, 2001 § 2.48, 2001 Tex. Gen. Laws at 2013–15 (amending TEX. 
WATER CODE ANN. § 36.108).   
184 Id. 
185 TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 36.116(b).  Protection of existing wells must be tied to 
amount and purpose of prior use.  See discussion infra Part V.A. 
186 Act of May 27, 2001 § 2.48, 2001 Tex. Gen. Laws at 2013–15 (amending TEX. 
WATER CODE ANN. § 36.108(b)). 
187 Id. § 2.17, 2001 Tex. Gen. Laws at 2000–01 (amending TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 
16.053). 
188 Id. § 2.18, 2001 Tex. Gen. Laws at 2001 (amending TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 
16.053).  
189 Act of May 30, 2005, 79th Leg., R.S. ch. 970, 2005 Tex. Gen. Laws 3247. 
190 Id. § 8, 2005 Tex. Gen. Laws at 3247, 3254–56 (amending TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 
36.108). 
 22
the GMA process in their statewide water forecasting.191  Lastly, the bill seemed to 
authorize, but did not explicitly require, a cap on groundwater permitting.192  
 
Before 2005, GCDs and GMAs were permitted to plan jointly, but HB 1763 
required that the GCDs with each GMA actually coordinate.193  This was a tall order 
considering there are numerous GCDs in each GMA—many with different theories of 
management and sustainability.194  GCDs had previously been allowed to define their 
own groundwater availability for their individual management plans, which made little 
sense geologically because many of the GCDs’ plans applied to the same water source.195  
HB 1763 sought to remedy this through joint planning intended to generate desired future 
conditions (DFCs) for an entire management area.196  DFCs are then used to calculate 
managed available groundwater (MAG), which is the amount of water available for 
removal while still maintaining the DFC. 197   Districts can use MAGs to structure 
pumping limits and other regulatory measures to be implemented to ensure that the DFC 
is met.198  Planning was meant to maintain the bottom-up procedures created by past 
legislatures while also creating a big picture for Texas groundwater sustainability.   
 
The first step in the new planning process was for the GCDs within each GMA to 
determine their DFCs for the water resource.199  A DFC is a way to determine what the 
region wants the resource to look like in the future.200  Management plans will flow from 
this goal.201  The districts were required to utilize scientific data including TWDB’s 
groundwater availability models to create their DFCs.202  If a GMA covered more than 
one aquifer or geographic area, individual DFCs could be established for each.203   
 
                                                 
191 Id. 
192  Id. § 11, 2005 Tex. Gen. Laws at 3258 (amending TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 
36.1132).  
193 Id. § 8, 2005 Tex. Gen. Laws at 3254–56 (amending TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 
36.108(c)). 
194 Mace et al., supra note 26, at 2. 
195 Id. 
196 Id. 
197 Id. 
198 Id. 
199 Act of May 30, 2005, § 8, 2005 Tex. Gen. Laws at 3254–56 (amending TEX. WATER 
CODE ANN. § 36.108 (West 2008)). 
200 Mace et al., supra note 26, at 2. 
201 Act of May 30, 2005, § 8, 2005 Tex. Gen. Laws at 3254–56 (amending TEX. WATER 
CODE ANN. § 36.108(d-2)). 
202 Id. § 5, 2005, Tex. Gen. Laws at 3251–52 (amending TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 
36.1071(a)(8)). 
203 Id. § 2, 2005 Tex. Gen. Laws at 3249–50 (amending TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 
36.001(25)). 
 23
Once a DFC was established, the TWDB prepared final models to translate that 
goal into a quantity of water, or MAG, that could be extracted annually and over a fifty-
year period and still meet the DFC.204   Then, “[a] district, to the extent possible, shall 
issue permits up to the point that the total volume of groundwater permitted equals the 
managed available groundwater.”205  A possible cap on permitting bestowed significant 
regulatory power that was previously unauthorized except in certain special districts.206   
 
The most recent changes to the planning process came in 2011 with Senate Bill 
660 (SB 660). 207   Like the others before it, this legislation attempted to clarify 
outstanding issues.  For example, although the term DFC had been used for years, the 
legislation had never defined it.  SB 660 defined it to mean “a quantitative description . . . 
of the desired condition of the groundwater resources in a management area at one or 
more specified future times.”208  To provide additional guidance, the bill also explains 
that DFCs “must provide a balance between the highest practicable level of groundwater 
production and the conservation, preservation, protection, recharging, and prevention of 
waste or groundwater and control of subsidence in the management area.”209 
 
In addition to clarifying the definition of DFC, the bill changed the term 
“Managed Available Groundwater” to “Modeled Available Groundwater.” 210   The 
legislature made this modification to more accurately reflect the term’s meaning and 
demonstrate that the numbers were based on the best data available and subject to data 
changes.  Finally, the bill added nine new factors that GCDs must consider when 
renewing or establishing DFCs and required that management plan goals and objectives 
be consistent with achieving applicable DFCs.211 
 
The continued development of the regional planning process and the apparent 
authorization of pumping caps to meet MAGs allowed districts to control withdrawals in 
a way that created legal conflicts between limitations on pumping and the common law 
rule of capture.  While this friction was new to most GCDs, special districts were already 
managing these conflicts.   
 
V. THE EDWARDS AQUIFER: A SPECIAL CASE 
                                                 
204 Mace et al., supra note 26, at 2; Act of May 30, 2005, § 8, 2005 Tex. Gen. Laws at 
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 While districts grappled with the ever-changing planning process and how and 
whether to implement a cap on pumping, the Edwards Aquifer Authority (EAA) was 
already very familiar with this concept.  The EAA is a legislatively created special 
district formed in response to a federal court ruling on an Endangered Species Act (ESA) 
claim brought by the Sierra Club.212  Because excessive pumping of the Edwards Aquifer 
was found to be threatening several endangered species, the state was obligated to create 
a firm-pumping cap in this region long before it was a statewide discussion.   
 
A. Sierra Club v. Lujan 
 
 The Edwards Aquifer is a karst aquifer located in Central Texas covering 
approximately 3,600 square miles.213  The majority of water enters the aquifer along 
surface streams in an area referred to as the “recharge zone.”214  The aquifer discharges 
naturally into several springs including Comal and San Marcos Springs.215  These springs 
are headwater tributaries for the Guadalupe River, which flows from Central Texas to the 
Gulf of Mexico.216  Water is withdrawn from the aquifer primarily through groundwater 
wells.217  Many interests are dependent on the aquifer, but the largest user is the City of 
San Antonio, which depends on the aquifer as its primary water source.218   
 
Several endangered species are also dependent on the flow of these headwater 
springs for their own survival.  Among them are the Texas Blind Salamander and the 
Fountain Darter.219  These and others threatened species were at the heart of the Sierra 
Club lawsuit.220  During the 1950s drought of record, Comal Springs completely dried up, 
which would not have happened without the additional depletion created by pumping.221  
                                                 
212 See Act of June 11, 1993, 73d Leg., R.S., ch. 626, § 1.01, 1993 Tex. Gen. Laws 2350, 
2350. 
213 Karst is a geologic landscape created by the dissolution of soluble rocks including 
limestone, dolomite and gypsum characterized by sinkholes, caves, and underground 
drainage systems. 
214 Hydrogeology of the Edwards Aquifer, EDWARDS AQUIFER AUTHORITY, 
http://www.edwardsaquifer.org/index.php/science_and_research/hydrogeology/ (last 
visited Mar. 18, 2013).  
215 Id.  
216 Vivian Elizabeth Smyrl, Guadalupe River, TEX. ST. HIST. ASS’N 
http://www.tshaonline.org/handbook/online/articles/rng01 (last visited Mar. 18, 2013).  
217 Sierra Club v. Lujan, MO-91-CA-069, 1993 WL 151353, at *3 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 1, 
1993). 
218 Darcy Alan Frownfelter, Edwards Aquifer Authority, in ESSENTIALS OF TEXAS WATER 
RESOURCES, supra note 140, at 334. 
219 Sierra Club, 1993 WL 151353, at *9. 
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221 Id. at *6. 
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Although San Marcos Springs did not totally dry up during the same time period, its flow 
was considerably diminished due to pumping.222   
 
Data presented at trial showed that, but for human withdrawals, the springs’ 
natural discharge would be stable.223  Evidence showed that continued pumping would 
result in extended no-flow periods for the springs in drought conditions.224  These dry 
periods would threaten the survival of the species that live there.225   Despite these known 
connections between the aquifers and the springs, neither the state nor the GCDs had 
established pumping limits at the time of the litigation.   
 
Section nine of ESA makes is illegal to “take” an endangered species.226  “Take” 
is broadly defined and includes anything that kills, harms, or harasses even a single 
individual animal designated as an endangered species, including harm or harassment of 
the endangered species’ habitat.227  Section four of the ESA creates a nondiscretionary 
duty for federal agencies to develop and implement a recovery plan for each endangered 
species, unless it is found that it would not promote the conservation of the species.228  
Sierra Club brought a lawsuit against the Department of the Interior and Fish and 
Wildlife Service, one of the federal agencies tasked with species protection under the 
ESA, to compel the Fish and Wildlife Service to take action based on its statutory 
obligation to complete a recovery plan.229  The judge agreed that the federal government 
failed to implement the recovery plans and did not identify the springflow requirements 
for the survival of the species.230    
 
As a result, the judge ordered Fish and Wildlife Service to determine the 
minimum springflow for each of the springs needed to protect listed species.231  More 
importantly, Judge Bunton directed the Texas Legislature to provide the appropriate 
management of the aquifer in such a way that the springflow would be maintained to 
protect the species.  “If the State of Texas fails or refuse[d] to regulate withdrawals from 
the Edwards Aquifer,” his court would implement management.232  This mandate paved 
the way for the Edwards Aquifer Authority Act (EAAA), enrolled just four months after 
the Sierra Club judgment was rendered.233 
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B. Creating the EAA 
 
At the time of the Sierra Club lawsuit, two existing groundwater districts 
managed Edwards Aquifer water. 234   These were the Edwards Underground Water 
District and the Medina Country Underground Water District.235  These districts had all 
the requirements and authorities as other GCDs described above, which was minimal 
because they preceded SB 1 and its progeny.  Pumping from the Edwards Aquifer had 
increased from 30,000 acre-feet per year at the turn of the century to 500,000 acre-feet 
per year at the time of litigation.236   
 
In response to the court’s decision in Sierra Club, the Texas Legislature passed 
the EAAA, which created the EAA as a special district.237  While authorized by the same 
constitutional amendment as other districts, this GCD has additional authority and 
regulations that others did not.238  Although the primary concern of the Sierra Club ruling 
was species protection, the EAA does not have the authority to regulate springflow 
because surface water is within the jurisdiction of the state.239  However, the EAA is 
required to manage the aquifer in such a way that flow is protected.240 
 
The biggest difference between the EAA and other districts was the establishment 
of a firm total pumping limit on the Edwards Aquifer. 241   The enabling legislation 
instructed the EAA to permit withdrawals not to exceed 450,000 acre-feet for each 
calendar year until December 31, 2007.242   For the period beginning January 1, 2008, 
permitted withdrawals cannot exceed 400,000 acre-feet per year.243  This number was 
later increased to the current amount of 572,000 acre-feet per year.244  Texas state law 
mandates an exemption from permitting requirements for livestock or domestic wells 
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across the state.245  The EAAA provided a similar exemption but required that all such 
wells be registered.246  Neither Chapter 36 nor the EAAA specifically provides that 
withdrawals from such wells cannot be limited by a GCD. 
 
The legislation also created a rubric for how permits were to be allocated.   
Permits were primarily issued to those who could show they had used Edwards Aquifer 
water in a beneficial way during the historic period.247  If an irrigator utilized unmetered 
Edwards Aquifer water, a permit would be issued for two acre-feet a year per acre 
irrigated during one year of the historic period, assuming all other permit requirements 
were met.248  Historic permit applications had to be received by March 1, 1994.249  Other 
than the stated exceptions, it is illegal to pump water from the Edwards Aquifer without 
an EAA permit. 
 
The EAAA recognized the potential conflict between the EAA permitting scheme 
and common law concepts of groundwater ownership.  It stated,  
 
[A]ction taken pursuant to this Act may not be construed as depriving or 
divesting the owner or the land, or these ownership rights or as impairing 
the contract rights of any person who purchases water . . . .  The 
legislature intends that just compensation be paid if implementation of this 
article causes a taking of private property . . . .250 
 
The drafters seemed to acknowledge that there was a limit to how much a regulatory 
authority could restrain property rights, but the EAAA explicitly stated that this 
permitting initiative did not exceed that limit.  Some were not convinced. 
 
C. Barshop v. Medina County Underground Water Conservation District 
 
 The EAA has generated conflict since its inception.  One of the first of these 
conflicts appeared in the Barshop case.251  In Barshop v. Medina County Underground 
Water Conservation District, plaintiffs argued that the permitting system created by the 
EAAA and implemented by the EAA violated their vested property right to withdraw 
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water.252  The plaintiffs complained “that the Act violates the takings clause in two 
ways.” 253   First, they asserted that certain provisions of the EAAA would operate 
automatically upon its effective date amounting to a taking.254  Second, they claimed the 
EAA’s application of the EAAA was unconstitutional.255   
 
As written, the EAAA was to become effective September 1, 1993. 256  
Declarations of historic use, which were required to receive a historic use permit, were 
due six months later on March 1, 1994.257  However, a voting rights challenge delayed 
the effective date of the EAAA beyond the historic use declaration deadline.258  Plaintiffs 
argued that all existing users would be forced to immediately cease water withdrawals 
because the deadline for them to apply for a permit based on past use had passed.259   
 
The Texas Supreme Court held that the legislation creating the EAA was not a 
facially unconstitutional infringement or taking of landowner’s groundwater property 
rights.260  It reasoned that the legislative intent behind the date was for the historic 
application deadline to be six months after the EAA’s enactment date.261  Because the 
enactment delay was unforeseen, the historic use deadline should also be postponed.262  
Regarding when property rights vest, the court recognized the dichotomy between the 
case law and the state’s constitutional obligation to regulate groundwater withdrawals.263  
Recognizing the future challenge, the court stated, “[t]he issue of when a particular 
regulation becomes an invasion of property rights in underground water is complex and 
multi-faceted;”264  however, Texas had to wait another sixteen years before the state 
supreme court ruled on that issue.  
 
VI. MOVING FROM CAPTURE TO OWNERSHIP 
 
 Although capture had been maintained in Texas for over 100 years, the addition 
of regulations and increased demand for water created many questions about the property 
interest capture created. 265   One of the issues that persisted was determining when 
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ownership actually began.  Did rule of capture only give a landowner the right to use with 
ownership commencing at the point of capture, or did a landowner have an ownership 
interest in the water prior to production?  As the court stated in Barshop, “parties 
fundamentally disagree on the nature of the property rights.”266  The answer to this 
question became critical in defining regulatory opportunities and constitutional 
limitations.267  Although a few cases danced around the issue, the Texas Supreme Court 
took the issue up directly in Edwards Aquifer Authority v. Day.268  The Day case framed 
the question of ownership; however, an understanding of the cases that came before this 
landmark opinion is necessary to fully grasp how the courts previously discussed capture 
in light of ownership.269  
  
A. Guitar Holding Co. v. Hudspeth County Underground Water Conservation District 
 
 As groundwater regulation increased, so did questions regarding the authority of 
GCDs to regulate in light of the common law right of capture.  The question of property 
rights and regulatory limitations reached the Texas Supreme Court in Guitar Holding Co. 
v. Hudspeth County Underground Water Conservation District.270  The case involved a 
large landowner’s challenge to a permitting scheme promulgated by a GCD.271  The 
Hudspeth County Underground Water Conservation District No. 1,272 established in the 
1950s, adopted a new management plan in an attempt to sustain the Bone Springs–
Victorio Peak Aquifer at historically optimal levels through regulation of groundwater 
withdrawals.273  
 
This plan included a permitting program “recogniz[ing] three types of permits: 1) 
validation permits, 2) operating permits, and 3) transfer permits.”274  Existing wells that 
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produced water during a defined period were entitled to validation permits.275   The 
system relied on historic use to allocated water permits.276  The user was obligated to 
show usage during the requisite time period.277  Irrigating landowners were entitled to a 
validation permit of four acre-feet of water per acre irrigated, subject to a district 
reduction to three acre-feet.278  Non-irrigating owners were entitled to a validation permit 
equal to “the maximum amount of water beneficially used in any one year during the 
[historic] period.”279  With this system, the district issued permits based on past types of 
use without consideration of the landowner’s intent as to future use.280  Therefore, an 
irrigator could gain a permit based on historic irrigation even if her future intent was sale 
and transport of the water out of the district.281  
 
Unfortunately, this system pitted different types of users against one another 
because the ability to obtain and then transfer water was predicated on past use.282  For 
transfer permits, there was also a higher standard for those applying for completely new 
permits than for those holding validation permits.283  Guitar Holding Company, a large 
landowner, only irrigated a small portion of land during the historic period and was 
therefore eligible for fewer water permits than a group of permitted irrigators.284  Guitar 
Holding Company brought suit challenging the validity of the permitting requirements.285   
 
The Texas Supreme Court ruled that the protection of historic use authorized by 
Chapter 36 was only for the exact use and location for which it had been used. 286  If 
either of those changed, the permit holder had to be treated like any other new 
applicant.287  Since no one had ever transferred water out of the basin, all transfers should 
be treated as new uses and not attached to prior use validation permits.288  In reaching this 
conclusion, the court took issue with the Texas Water Code’s definition of “use” and 
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applied this to the district rules.289  Some commentators criticized that this application 
may have constituted legislating from the bench.290 
 
 While this case may not, on its surface, involve ownership, it does directly relate 
to the potential property right created by law.  If a large landowner, such as Guitar 
Holding Company, is only eligible to pump a very small portion of water from 
underneath its land, does such restriction violate the right created by East and subsequent 
cases?  It is hard to imagine that this issue did not play into the court’s analysis, even if it 
was not the precise question before it.  In fact, the opinion mentioned potential disparity 
between land ownership and water rights.291  The ability to have water for sale and 
transfer is a potential economic boon for the rights holder.  Ultimately, it was perceived 
unfairness in the loss of this income through lost transfer earnings that may have driven 
the decision.292  
 
This case may have been the first hint of a lack of deference to the regulatory 
bodies created by the legislature.  The heavy emphasis on the constitutional amendment 
in many of the previous cases, which gives all the power to regulate to the legislature, 
was not even mentioned here.  The Guitar opinion may also provide a window into the 
court’s thoughts on the role of private property rights as they relate to state regulatory 
authority.  While the Texas Supreme Court recognized that the Texas Water Code 
delegated management of groundwater to the GCDs and vested them with broad 
regulatory powers, it was also willing to involve itself in the details of management.293  
Conflicts between property rights and regulatory authority continued to arise as 
regulation increased, eventually forcing courts to face the dispute directly.   
 
B. Del Rio and Bragg 
 
 As groundwater litigation continued, the question of ownership was destined to 
reappear.  In City of Del Rio v. Clayton Sam Colt Hamilton Trust (City of Del Rio), 
litigants asked the court to resolve the nature of groundwater ownership.294  Unlike other 
cases, this case did not involve a groundwater district—it was actually a contracts 
claim.295   
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Clayton Sam Colt Hamilton Trust (Trust) sold the City of Del Rio (Del Rio) a 15-
acre plot of land located within its 3,200-acre tract.296  The conveyance deed reserved “all 
water rights associated with said tract,” but did not reserve a right of entry to produce the 
water.297  Some time later, Del Rio installed a pumping well and began withdrawing 
groundwater.298  The Trust brought suit against the city claiming Del Rio violated the 
deed and that the Trust owned the groundwater.299  Del Rio argued that the Trust could 
not legally retain ownership of the water when it deeded the property because the surface 
owner did not have absolute ownership.300   
 
San Antonio’s Fourth Court of Appeals held that the rule of capture was a 
corollary to absolute ownership.301  The Trust argued that if ownership could only be 
perfected by capture, an owner’s water rights would be limited by the size of her 
“bucket.”302  The court agreed with the Trust that the water could be reserved before it 
was captured and that to rule otherwise would essentially bring all water rights 
conveyances to a halt.303  Water, once produced, could be transferred.  Since reservation 
of the groundwater was possible, the Trust had the legal right to bifurcate the water from 
the surface and exempt it from the transfer, which was evidenced in the language of the 
deed.304 
 
Another ownership case that is still moving through the courts is Bragg v. 
Edwards Aquifer Authority.  Unlike Del Rio, this case is a more typical case of a permit 
applicant suing a permitting authority.305  The Braggs requested groundwater permits 
from the EAA for two pecan farms, totaling about 625 acre-feet per year.306  The EAA 
denied one permit because there had been no pumping within the statutory historical use 
period.307  For the other property, the EAA limited the permit to 120 acre-feet per year, 
based on the two acre-feet per year standard provided in its rules.308   
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Using the severe economic impact test set out by Penn Central Transportation 
Co. v. New York City, the Medina County district court held that the Braggs were entitled 
to compensation of $732,493 for the EAA’s failure to issue the requested pumping 
permits. 309   The case is currently on appeal before San Antonio’s Fourth Court of 
Appeals.  The outcome of this case is still unknown; however, there have been important 
judicial and legislative developments since Judge Lee’s opinion in Bragg, which may 
affect the result.  Perhaps the most important of these is the Day case.    
 
C. The Day Departure 
 
 It took over 100 years, but the state supreme court finally faced the question of 
when ownership in groundwater began and what, if any, were the constitutional 
limitations of GCD regulations.  Although Day was heard in February of 2010, the 
court’s written opinion took another two years.  In anticipation of the court’s decision, 
and perhaps in an effort to circumvent it, the Texas Legislature passed Senate Bill 332 
(SB 332), which attempted to clarify the relationship between districts and ownership 
rights before the court ruled.310  Although SB 332 was freshly promulgated when the 
court issued its decision, the ruling went beyond the language in the bill with regard to 
defining a groundwater right.  Despite the fact that the court had been critical of right of 
capture in its past rulings, the Day decision made little mention of the wisdom of the 
system as it created a vested right in water.  
 
1. SB 332 
 
 When the 2011 legislative session commenced, the Texas Supreme Court had 
been contemplating the Day case for a year.  As the state awaited a ruling, there were 
growing concerns on both sides regarding the possible outcome.  With SB 322, the 
legislature attempted to settle the question pending before the court in advance of the 
ruling by amending the Texas Water Code groundwater ownership section.311  The first 
draft of the bill, submitted by Senator Fraser, proposed to modify the existing language 
by adding the phrase “a landowner, or the landowner’s lessee or assigns, has a vested” 
ownership interest.312  The bill went on to provide that nothing in the code could be 
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construed as granting authority to deprive or divest a landowner of that interest except 
through reasonable rules promulgated by a district.313  
 
 Throughout session, the bill was negotiated and ultimately the final version was 
stripped of the word “vested.” 314   Although private property interest groups heavily 
promoted the explicit inclusion of “vested,” the pertinent part of the final bill read: “the 
legislature recognizes that the landowner owns the groundwater below the surface of the 
landowner’s land as real property.”315  This interest does not provide an owner the right 
to capture a specific amount of groundwater below the surface of that landowner’s 
land.316   
 
Unlike the Fraser original, which provided little recognition of the districts’ 
authority, the final version amended Texas Water Code section 36.002, giving it 
considerably more detail.  The final version of the bill stated that an owner’s ability to 
drill and pump water does not “affect the ability of a district to regulate groundwater 
production as authorized under Section 36.113, 36.116, or 36.112 or otherwise” under 
Chapter 36.317  The newly amended statute also recognized the ability of districts to limit 
drilling based on well spacing or tract size as adopted by the district, echoing the Chapter 
36 additions in response to the South Plains case.318  These terms explicitly clarified that 
this bill did not change the districts’ authority created by SB 2.319    
 
Finally, the bill specified that districts are not required to adopt a rule that 
“allocate[s] a proportionate share of available groundwater for production from the 
aquifer based on the number of acres owned by the landowner.” 320   Districts are 
instructed to consider ownership and rights during their creation and enforcement of 
rules.321   The bill also contained a special provision for the EAA and other special 
districts, stating that the “ownership” of groundwater as described in the first part of the 
bill “does not affect the ability [of the EAA] to regulate” as authorized by the 
legislature.322  
 
 The enrolled bill attempted to codify the complicated history of both common law 
and legislative initiatives to regulate groundwater.  It did not seek to limit districts’ 
authority and the efforts made over the years to empower them.  Although the bill 
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analysis for the original version reflected that the bill’s purpose was to define the owner’s 
vested right in groundwater, the word “vested” did not appear in the bill as promulgated.  
Further, it is telling that the final version provided considerably more recognition of 
groundwater authority than its predecessor.323  It seemed as though the issue had been 
solved, but the court was still mulling over Day and it was unclear how the decision 
would be handled in light of SB 332. 
 
2. Edwards Aquifer Authority v. Day 
 
 Previous case law and legislative efforts to regulate groundwater culminated in 
the Day case.  On February 24, 2012, the Texas Supreme Court finally weighed in on 
groundwater ownership in a way it never had before.324  The court ruled that landowners 
have a vested ownership right in groundwater below their land even before it is 
captured.325  While many of the impacts of the Day decision have yet to be seen, the 
opinion can be evaluated within the context of what came before it.   
 
 In 1994, R. Burrel Day and Joel McDaniel (Day) purchased acreage within the 
EAA’s jurisdiction.326  Their intent was to grow oats and peanuts as well as graze cattle 
on the land.327  Although the land did not contain a working well, there was a lake used 
for irrigation that was filled by an intermittent creek, overland flow, and some artesian 
groundwater flow.328  Day applied for a permit to allow 700 acre-feet of water a year 
based on evidentiary statements that 300 acres were irrigated during the historic period as 
well fifty acre-feet for recreational use in the lake.329  As instructed by the enabling 
legislation, initial regular permits were based on beneficial use of water during the 
historic period.330     
 
 In 1997, Day received information from the EAA that there was a preliminary 
finding that he was entitled to the requested 600 acre-feet of water.331  In 1999, after 
receiving approval from the EAA to change the diversion location, Day drilled a new 
                                                 
323 Senate Comm. On Natural Resources, Bill Analysis, Tex. S.B. 332, 82d Leg., R.S. 
(2011). 
324 See Edwards Aquifer Auth. v. Day, 369 S.W.3d 814 (Tex. 2012).   
325 Id. at 831.   
326 Id. at 818.   
327 Id.   
328 Id.  There was a well drilled on the land in the mid 1950s, which was used for 
irrigation until the early 1970s when it collapsed and the pump was subsequently 
removed.  Id.  The well was under sufficient pressure that continued to flow.  Id.  The 
previous owner constructed a ditch to convey the artesian flow to the creek, which fed the 
lake.  Id. 
329 Id. at 820.  Existing irrigation was allowed a permit for no less than two acre-feet a 
year for each acre of land irrigated in one calendar year during the historical period.  Id. 
330 Id.   
331 Id.   
 36
well even though the EAA had not yet officially ruled on his permit.332  In November 
2000, the EAA denied the application because well “withdrawals . . . were not placed to a 
beneficial use.”333   
 
Day protested the EAA decision to the State Office of Administrative Hearing 
(SOAH).334  During discovery at SOAH, a previous landowner testified that 150 acres 
were irrigated during the historic period using a sprinkler, which drew water from the 
lake and was therefore surface water. 335   Only seven acres were irrigated using 
exclusively well water.336  The administrative law judge determined that water from the 
lake, which included some overland flow from the artesian well, was surface water and 
not under EAA authority. 337   Based on the testimony, the administrative law judge 
determined that the maximum beneficial use of groundwater to earn a permit was 
fourteen acre-feet calculated from the seven acres that used groundwater directly from the 
well for irrigation.338  The EAA agreed and issued a permit in that amount.339   
 
Day appealed this finding, claiming, in part, that the decision amounted to a 
taking in violation of the Texas Constitution. 340   The trial court granted summary 
judgment for Day regarding the characterization of the 150 acres of irrigated water.  
However, the EAA prevailed on summary judgment for all constitutional claims 
including the takings claim based on the argument that landowners have no vested, 
protectable property right in groundwater prior to capture.341  The court of appeals agreed 
with the EAA and affirmed the determination of fourteen acre-feet, but remanded the 
case on the takings claim, stating that “‘landowners have some ownership rights in the 
groundwater beneath their property . . . entitled to constitutional protection.’”342   
 
The EAA, Day, and the State of Texas—whom the EAA impleaded as a third-
party defendant—filed petitions for discretionary review with the Texas Supreme 
Court.343   The court granted the petitions, and concluded, in accordance with SOAH and 
the appellate court’s finding, that the EAA did not err by limiting Day’s permit to 
fourteen acre-feet.344  This decision was based in part, as it had been in previous forums, 
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on the fact that the character of the water changed from groundwater to surface water as it 
flowed into and was contained by the surface lake.345  In addition, there was no evidence 
provided to show that the 150 acres were irrigated on a consistent basis.346  The primary 
use of the lake appeared to be for recreational purposes.347 
 
The issue that garnered the most attention was whether Day had a constitutionally 
protected interest in the groundwater in place.348  The court ultimately held that he did.349  
However, it remanded to determine the specific issue of whether a taking had occurred in 
this case.350  Despite what many parties claimed before the opinion was issued, the court 
was clear in stating that, although ownership in place had long been the rule for oil and 
gas in Texas, the determination of when groundwater ownership began was a question of 
first impression.351  Despite the court’s acknowledgement that rule of capture could exist 
without ownership in place, it held that, in Texas, the two are one and the same.352 
 
The court continued to recognize the role of GCDs and the constitutional 
amendment that allowed for their creation.353  The opinion also reiterated the regulations 
that dictate a district’s authority to regulate wells.354  The court referred to recently 
promulgated SB 332 to show that the legislature had recognized this relationship between 
owners and regulators.355   However, the court could not say with certainty that SB 332 
created a vested ownership right in groundwater.  Instead, the opinion stated “the 
Legislature appears to mean ownership in place.” 356   It made no mention of the 
conspicuous absence of the word “vested,” which, although present in previous drafts, 
was ultimately removed.357  The opinion also reiterated the court’s thoughts in Bragg 
regarding the EAAA provision that requires “just compensation be paid if 
implementation of [the Act] causes a taking of private property.”358  The court read this to 
mean that the legislature recognized that limiting water rights for a public use might be a 
taking; however, the court did not say that the permitting system as written in EAAA 
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would require compensation.359  Instead, despite the attempted carve-out for the EAA in 
SB 332, the court directed standard takings analysis on any pumping regulations created 
by a GCD including those implemented by the EAA.360 
 
Notably missing in the opinion, in stark contrast to previous cases, was any 
criticism of capture as a management system or any recommendations that the legislature 
should change it.  This becomes more conspicuous considering that the author of the 
majority opinion in Day was Justice Hecht—the same Justice who wrote the concurring 
opinion in Sipriano.  In Sipriano, Justice Hecht strongly advocated for the replacement of 
capture with a more reasonable system such as the Restatement.361   
 
Much of the briefing from the EAA and some amicus briefs focused on the 
importance of protecting the EAA’s ability to permit without fear of an onslaught of 
takings claims.362  It was argued that any threat to the permitting scheme would violate 
the intention of the state legislature when it created the EAA.363  Some amicus briefs 
attempted to extrapolate the consequences that a takings finding would have on other 
GCDs.364  The amicus brief of Angela Garcia and the Environmental Defense Fund listed 
the long history of legislative actions created to limit groundwater mining, including 
district creation and the regional planning process.365  It was argued that to hold that a 
landowner had a constitutionally vested right in groundwater would threaten the ability of 
the EAA and other GCDs to manage groundwater in a sustainable way.366    
 
The court disagreed with these arguments, stating that during its existence, there 
had only been a handful of takings claims against the EAA.367  While the holding in Day 
was certainly important to groundwater advocates and property owners alike, it 
represented a significant change in the court’s tone with regard to its deference to the 
legislature and its willingness to weigh in regarding groundwater regulation.  Although 
the court had criticized capture in past decisions, no criticisms appeared in this opinion, 
and it is unclear what caused this shift.   
 
VII. WHY THE CHANGE? 
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 To many, the Day decision was a logical evolution of the court’s protection of the 
rule of capture first established in East.  However, when evaluating the judicial and 
legislative history as a whole, the Day decision marked a departure from the previous 
trend of court decisions.  Throughout history, although the court respected the East 
decision in name, it regularly deferred to the increased regulation created by the 
legislature and often encouraged it.  Dicta from several decisions indicates that previous 
courts felt that right of capture might not be a wise allocation scheme for a growing state 
and that more regulation was needed.368  This was particularly true in Sipriano, where the 
concurrence noted that the East court’s concerns were no longer valid.369  Although Day 
does not technically overturn previous case law because the specific issue of ownership 
was one of first impression, the direction of the opinion varies significantly from previous 
groundwater cases creating implications for future water and environmental issues. 
 
The East court chose rule of capture in part because it did not have any legislative 
direction and did not understand groundwater characteristics.370  The opinion indicated 
that had the legislature previously acted on groundwater, the court would have deferred to 
that action.371  Just a few years after the East case, the legislature did act by passing the 
conservation amendment placing the role of groundwater regulation with the legislature 
even though a common law precedent was already set.372  
 
For a period of time, the courts deferred to the legislature regarding the allocation 
of Texas’s groundwater.  Subsequent cases leaned heavily on legislative efforts to 
regulate use and plan for the future.  This is even true of cases that did not involve direct 
challenges to the rule of capture.  In City of Corpus Christi, the Texas Supreme Court 
recognized that groundwater was no longer “occult” as it was described in East; however, 
the court maintained deference to the role of the legislature established by the 
constitutional amendment and clarified the relationship between the court and lawmaker 
by stating, “[t]he power certainly does not lie with the courts to usurp the legislative 
function.”373  The court noted that because the legislature had not limited transportation 
of groundwater based on excessive water loss, the court could not create such a rule.374  
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The court did state, perhaps encouragingly, that the legislature was currently in session so 
state legislators would have the chance to create such a law if they were so inclined.375   
 
Similarly, in Friendswood Development, the court stated, “We agree that some 
aspects of the English or common law rule as to underground waters are harsh and 
outmoded, and the rule has been severely criticized since its reaffirmation by this Court 
in [City of Corpus Christi].”376  However, feeling bound by stare decisis, the court 
maintained capture, but used recent legislative action as an “opportunity to discard an 
objectionable aspect of the court-made English rule” and included subsidence through 
negligent pumping as a limit to capture. 377   Both of these cases reflect the court’s 
recognition of its obligation to abide by East while still supporting increased regulation 
and indicating that a change to capture might be necessary. 
 
Sipriano was the court’s first modern opportunity to change the common law rule 
of capture.  Although the court ultimately upheld capture, language hinting at opposition 
to the system itself was prominent throughout the Sipriano opinion.378  The court warned 
that while groundwater allocation was the responsibility of the legislature, if the 
legislature was not willing to do its job, the court would have no trouble stepping in.379  
All indications were that the court was encouraging the legislature to move away from 
right of capture, “or else.”  Sipriano was argued before the court shortly after SB 1—
Texas’s first omnibus water bill—was passed, which gave additional authority to 
GCDs.380  The court felt it important to allow such landmark legislation time to take 
effect.381   This deference to SB 1 can be interpreted as an affirmation of increased 
groundwater regulation from the court.382  In addition to the majority opinion, Justice 
Hecht’s concurrence was particularly critical of capture and advocated for its 
replacement.383  He stated that “it has become clear, if it was not before, that it is not 
regulation that threatens progress, but the lack of it.”384   It is an interesting statement to 
consider when reading the Day opinion, which Justice Hecht also authored. 
 
Finally, the court reached the Day case.  As in previous cases, the court upheld the 
right of capture; however, unlike those decisions, Day contained no discussion of the 
constitutional amendment or the importance of legislative authority, nor mention that 
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capture may need to change in the future.385  While it recognized SB 332 and GCDs, the 
court appeared to want to reign in the power that was previously encouraged, even 
reading “vesting” into SB 332.386  There was no discussion of changed circumstances, as 
was seen in Sipriano, which is particularly notable because the frequency of water issues 
has only increased since that ruling.  Instead, the court’s holding in Day could arguably 
inhibit the legislatively created districts from doing their job as defined in their 
promulgating directives.387  In particular, the ruling could endanger the EAA, which was 
a legislatively-created special district that issued permits based on legislative direction.   
This outcome is particularly ironic considering that the motivation behind the EAAA’s 
creation was a desire to remedy the lack of regulation that had led to damaging over 
pumping 
 
It is a challenge to understand the shift from the language of the previous cases to 
the court’s decision in Day.  There are several possible reasons why the court ruled as it 
did in Day.  First, the Day decision could have been based on a determination that the 
court is the appropriate source for property law clarifications.  Despite the presence of 
legislatively created districts’ rulemaking, some common law considerations may 
continue to lay with the court.  The decision may also be a testament to the current 
importance placed on private property in Texas, as evidenced by legislative initiatives 
and other court rulings.  Finally, perhaps the court was simply trying to align Texas’s 
groundwater regime with that of oil and gas.  If this is true, it raises significant questions 
about whether the court also intended other aspects of oil and gas law, such as correlative 
rights, to extend to groundwater.  Understanding the motivation of the Day opinion is an 
important step in predicting how the court may rule in future cases involving upcoming 
water and other environmental issues.  
 
A. Courts v. Legislature  
 
 Over the last hundred years, American law has shifted from a system dominated 
by common law to one that is primarily statute driven.388  A major driver of this shift was 
the proliferation of agencies and other regulatory authorities tasked with rulemaking.389 
Agencies were usually given broad powers to apply the laws of the day, add specificity to 
legislative goals, and adjust regulations to the changing times; however, increased 
statutorification of this kind can create questions of jurisdiction.390  This is the conflict in 
Texas groundwater.  Here, the constitutional amendment extends jurisdiction of the 
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police power over natural resources to the legislature.391  Pursuant to the amendment, 
GCDs were created to be the rulemaking agencies.392  However, this system was enacted 
after a common law rule was already present and continued contemporaneously with 
litigation concerning similar issues.  These dual tracks raised questions about which 
entity had the authority to define and enforce groundwater and associated property rights.  
 
The creation of an administrative body with regulatory authority does not divest 
the courts from all jurisdiction over the body’s actions. 393   Concurrent jurisdiction 
between courts and agencies has always been allowed by the judicial system.394  Courts 
may still have authority in some common-law areas in addition to common law expressly 
retained by the judiciary. 395  Constitutional adjudications remain with courts. 396   For 
example, all property is held subject to the valid exercise of the state’s police power.397  It 
is settled that when regulations go beyond the valid police power, it is an unconstitutional 
taking of private property.398  This constitutional question creates judicial authority over 
the regulatory body to interpret if a taking occurred; however, this evaluation can only 
occur once a vested right has been established.399   
 
This is distinguishable from the Day case.  Certainly, Texas courts have the right 
to determine if a regulation constitutes an exceedance of police power, but the court here 
is actually defining the property right itself, which must be determined before a takings 
analysis can take place.  The current focus is whether this was proper based on the 
precedence or if the court should have deferred to legislative efforts to define and 
regulate groundwater rights as it had in the past.  To answer that question, one must first 
determine if the right in question was once reserved by the courts or delegated 
exclusively to the legislature.   
 
The Texas Supreme Court stated that “[w]here the issue is one inherently judicial 
in nature . . . the courts are not ousted from jurisdiction unless the Legislature, by a valid 
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statute, has explicitly granted exclusive jurisdiction to the administrative body.”400  The 
same court repeatedly stated that the conservation amendment placed groundwater 
regulation exclusively with the legislature and, by proxy, with GCDs. 401   Previous 
groundwater decisions deferred to legislative regulations for that reason.402  In contrast, 
Day did not.  It could be argued that maintaining right of capture constituted deference; 
however, Justice Hecht’s own words in Sipriano counter that notion.  “It is hard to see 
how maintaining the rule of capture can be justified as deference to the Legislature’s 
constitutional province when the rule is contrary to the local regulation that is the 
Legislature’s preferred method of groundwater management.”403  In contrast, the Day 
opinion included no reference to the amendment or the concerns regarding capture voiced 
in Sipriano.   
 
 It is arguable that this decision was not an issue of deference because the court 
felt that determining a property right was a common law principle reserved for the 
judiciary. 404  Texas oil and gas law serves as a good guidepost regarding the 
differentiation between the court’s authority and other regulatory bodies in assigning or 
amending property rights.  Although the Texas Railroad Commission (RRC) is vested 
with broad powers, it has no power to determine property rights.405  Authority to resolve 
title disputes or determinations of subsurface trespasses is maintained by the judiciary.406  
The RRC is allowed to manage where or whether a well can be drilled, but is not 
permitted to determine ownership of oil and gas or how proceeds from sales can be 
apportioned between owners.407  The holdings in these cases explain that the authority of 
the legislatively-created Texas Railroad Commission is limited to the state’s goals of  
“preventing waste and conserving natural resources.”408   
                                                 
400 A.W. Gregg v. Delhi-Taylor Oil Corp., 344 S.W.2d 411, 415 (Tex. 1961) (emphasis 
added). 
401See e.g., City of Corpus Christi v. City of Pleasanton, 276 S.W.2d 798, 800–01 (Tex. 
1955). 
402 See e.g., id. at 803, 805 (refusing to limit bed and banks allowances based on waste 
because the Texas Constitution placed the authority to do so with the legislature). 
403 Sipriano v. Great Spring Waters of Am., Inc., 1 S.W.3d 75, 83 (Tex. 1999) (Hecht, J., 
concurring). 
404 See CALABRESI, supra note 74, at 163–64; Mary A. Keeney, Primary and Exclusive 
Agency Jurisdiction: Impact on Court Litigation, 10 TEX. TECH. ADMIN. L.J. 471, 495 
(2009). 
405 Jones v. Killingsworth, 403 S.W.2d 325, 328 (Tex. 1965). 
406 A.W. Gregg v. Delhi-Taylor Oil Corp., 344 S.W.2d 411, 415 (Tex. 1961). 
407 56 TEX. JUR. 3D Oil and Gas § 737. 
408 Seagull Energy E & P, Inc., v. R.R. Comm’n of Tex., 226 S.W.3d 383, 389 (Tex. 
2007); see TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 85.201 (2011).  Determining what issue belongs 
to which entity is not always a straightforward analysis.  For example, in Coastal Oil & 
Gas Corp. v. Garza Energy Trust, the court held that, although law of trespass was a 
property claim for the courts, determining the value of oil and gas drained by hydraulic 
fracturing is more appropriate at the agency level.  268 S.W.3d 1, 14–16 (Tex. 2008). 
 44
 
 While it is true that some legal power lies with the courts and not with the 
legislature, the legislative precedent and the court’s language contradict the premise that 
this issue was maintained by the courts in the context of groundwater.  First, the 
legislature was vested with management.  Then, on several occasions, the court 
specifically called on the legislature to increase groundwater regulations.  In his Sipriano 
concurrence, Justice Hecht, then an advocate for more regulation, evaluated reasonable 
use as a potential alternative to capture.409  Although he remarked that reasonable use was 
not a perfect solution, he thought it preferable to the current regime. 410   Since the 
Sipriano ruling, the legislature has increased regulatory authority through a series of bills 
and GCD-promulgated regulations.411  If the Day court had followed its own precedent, it 
would have deferred to the legislature citing the absence of the word “vested” in SB 332 
and the special exception the bill included for the EAA, which was clearly meant to offer 
them additional protection in a regulatory review.   
 
B. Private Property Rights 
 
 Many hailed the Day decision as another victory for private property owners. 
Celebrants included Texas state officials as well as special interest groups.412  Each of 
these factions viewed the ruling as a welcomed constraint on the unfettered growth of 
regulations limiting property rights.413   The State Comptroller’s Office stated, “[t]he 
court’s opinion . . . provides a capstone for decades of efforts by the Texas Legislature to 
defend and protect private real property rights.”414  Although Texas has a history of 
property rights legislation, individual rights have not been the focus of groundwater 
regulations.  At the very least, there was an attempt to balance individual rights with the 
sustainability of the resource in a way that benefitted the whole state.     
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Private property rights have always been important to Texans.415  Perhaps it is 
because the state has a higher percentage of privately held land than any other state.416  It 
may also stem from the independent nature of Texans.  Whatever the reason, Texas’s 
lawmakers and courts have attempted to protect property rights since early in the state’s 
history.  Article I of the Texas Constitution established the sanctity of private rights 
stating, “No person’s property shall be taken, damaged, or destroyed for or applied to 
public use without adequate compensation being made.” 417   In addition to this 
overarching protection, Texas continued to promulgate legislation to protect property 
rights.  Most of these bills were passed in reaction to regulatory changes or court 
decisions that were interpreted as threats to private rights.  At times, Texas’s deference to 
private property rights has been criticized because it valued those rights higher that the 
public good.418  
 
In 1995, the legislature passed the Texas Private Real Property Rights 
Preservation Act.419  The bill was motivated by increased regulations in many sectors 
including the environment. 420   “The Act represents the Texas legislature's 
acknowledgment of the importance of protecting private real property interests.”421  The 
bill required governmental entities to consider whether takings of private real property 
may result from their actions.422  Failure to do so could lead to litigation or invalidation 
of the governmental action.423  Under the Act, a property owner can sue the government 
entity that issued a regulation if the regulation diminished property value by at least 
25%.424 
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While Texas has always valued private property rights, recent legislation 
demonstrated that their protection has never been so paramount.  After the landmark 2005 
Supreme Court Kelo opinion, in which eminent domain was permitted for a “public use,” 
Texas was one of the first states that attempted to enact response legislation.425  In 2011, 
Texas passed a law to further protect private property interests.426  Senate Bill 18 (SB 18) 
limited what could qualify for the “public use” for the purposes of eminent domain.427  
The bill also sought to protect the landowner from underpriced compensation and 
included protections for circumstances if the project, which necessitated the eminent 
domain proceeding, was not completed.428   
 
Property rights have also seen increased protection in the Texas courts.429  With 
an elected judiciary, concerns often arise that political sentiments can find their way into 
court rulings.430  Day may be just another example of the rise in property rights interests 
held by Texas citizens along with the general rejection of additional regulations.  Again, 
this was a shift in tone from previous case law.  Although, previous groundwater cases 
involved property rights, they also mentioned the importance of a management system 
that benefitted the greater good of the state as well as protection of the individual.431   
 
Both East and Sipriano involved conflicts between landowners, so the court 
attempted to balance the interests by giving each landowner an equal right to capture the 
water under his or her property.432  Even in Sipriano, which did not involve a regulatory 
body, the court seemed concerned about the continuation of protecting individual 
property rights in light of growing demand and controversy.433  The court qualified its 
protection of the right by indicating that it might be appropriate for change at a later 
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date.434  In fact, a primary reason for not changing common law was deference to the 
regulatory changes added by SB1, not protection the individual rights.  Again, this 
consideration was not reflected in the Day opinion. 
 
If the Day decision was, in fact, a victory for private rights, it is worth noting 
what the court did not say.  The court did not say that the facts presented in Day 
constituted a taking.435   Texas courts have followed federal case history for takings 
claims.436  Neither the Texas courts nor the United States Supreme Court has established 
a bright line test for a taking analysis; however, the general rule is state government 
conduct creates a categorical taking when it invades or physically appropriates property, 
or when it unreasonably interferes with the right to use and enjoy property.437  In Day, the 
court applied the facts to the Penn Central test and held that there was not enough 
evidence to warrant summary judgment for Day on the takings claim.438  Although the 
case was remanded on that issue, their analysis indicated that the permit would not meet 
the takings standard.439  While there are some signals that the Day decision might have 
been motivated by private property protections there is another interpretation.  It is 
possible that the court was just trying to simplify an already complicated system.   
 
C. A Move Towards More Regulation: The Oil and Gas Model 
 
 The motivation for the Day decision may be found in the court’s own words.  The 
vesting of rights in place could have been an effort to align the groundwater process with   
oil and gas law and thus provide additional regulations.  Texas established right of 
capture for oil and gas many years ago.440  However, unlike in the groundwater context, 
the right of capture parameters in the oil and gas arena are well defined.  
 
 Texas courts long ago established that a landowner holds a vested interest in the 
minerals in the ground. This right is subject to the same constitutional amendment 
discussed in previous sections.441  Instead of regionalized GCDs, the legislature created 
the RRC to manage minerals through the promulgation of rules and regulations.442  The 
RRC is specifically authorized to conserve the natural resources by determining whether 
wells may be drilled and how much oil or gas may be produced from permitted wells, as 
well as promulgating and enforcing density and spacing rules.443 Although the RRC is 
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tasked with securing “the state’s goals of preventing waste and conserving natural 
resources,” it also limits production in a way that protects similar rights held by 
neighboring property owners.444  These are called correlative rights.445 
 
The doctrine of correlative rights was established as a means to prevent waste and 
confiscation.  The doctrine gives every property owner the opportunity to recover the oil 
and gas in or under his land.446  The owner’s right of capture is subject to correlative 
rights.447  While early oil and gas precedent allowed unfettered pumping without liability 
for drainage in a neighbor’s property, this was eventually found to be at odds with a right 
of capture doctrine.448  If there is no remedy for a landowner who is harmed by losing 
their minerals to another, the property right becomes illusory.449  The Texas Supreme 
Court approved correlative rights in the right of capture for minerals and it is currently 
enumerated as one of the RRC’s statutory goals; therefore, regulation to protect 
correlative rights is not a taking.450  One of the reasons correlative rights were extended 
to property owners was because experts can now approximate the amount of oil and gas 
in place in a common pool, and determine what is recoverable by each tract owner under 
certain operating conditions.451  This was essential in a harm determination and was not 
always possible in the early years of the doctrine.452 
 
 Language throughout the Day opinion demonstrated the court’s attempt to align 
groundwater allocation with the statewide treatment of oil and gas.  Because ownership 
of groundwater was an issue of first impression, the court turned to well-established oil 
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and gas law to guide its analysis.453  The opinion identifies similarities between to the two 
resources.454  Using its reasoning in Texas Co., the Day court supported the decision to 
own groundwater in place in spite of its fugacious nature.455  In the end, the language 
used to describe the current state of groundwater ownership came directly from an oil and 
gas holding.456 
 
In contrast to oil and gas jurisprudence, past groundwater cases did not include 
correlative rights and these rights have not been explicitly added by the legislature.457  
Therefore, before Day, there was no remedy for a landowner whose water was drained by 
another user if the water was used for legitimate purposes.458  The court in Day, however, 
argued that the very limited rules established in East, which disallow malice or wanton 
conduct, imply that some form of correlative rights are available for groundwater.459  The 
court stated that this limitation is comparable to the oil and gas prohibition on waste, 
although the term “waste” has been used differently in the oil and gas context than the 
word “malice” has been interpreted in water cases.  In fact, groundwater cases have 
allowed significant amounts of waste under rule of capture despite any impact on 
neighboring owners.460  In addition, previous interpretations of capture concluded that 
correlative rights did not exist in Texas groundwater law.461   
 
The court in Day also attempted to equate the RRC goal of protecting correlative 
rights with EAAA provisions by arguing that the permitting plan provides an applicant 
with a “fair share” of water.462  However, in making that argument, the court did not cite 
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to the EAAA promulgating regulations, and a review of that legislation reveals no 
reference to the words “fair share” or “correlative rights.”  Even if the EAAA permitting 
system is read broadly to provide a fair share to applicants, that is really only true as to 
those who can show a historic, beneficial use, unless the court is referring to the domestic 
and livestock exemption.  It is difficult to parallel either the domestic exception or a 
limited historic use right to what is meant by “fair share” in an oil and gas context.  
Unlike situations where new permits are tied to historic use, in oil and gas any 
leaseholder is entitled to a fair share of the minerals regardless of whether previous 
development occurred. 
 
Courts defining oil and gas property rights did not view drainage or correlative 
rights to be “at odds” with the rule of capture.463  Instead, they redefined the parameters 
of the rule by clarifying that it did not sanction negligent or wasteful practices and 
included the fair share or correlative rights principal.464  Relying on this definition of the 
oil and gas property right, courts rejected owners’ claims that regulations signed to 
prevent waste or protect correlative rights constituted a “taking” of their property.465   
 
By invoking the oil and gas law analogy in Day, the court has potentially 
provided an answer to future takings challenges aimed at groundwater regulation.466  
Specifically, if water rights are defined as vested but subject to the rule of capture, which 
includes waste prevention and correlative rights, then regulations based on those 
parameters are not, in general, a taking of that property right.467  When looking at the 
court’s reasoning in Day, it seems as though the court is not opposed to an expanded 
application of correlative rights and appears to believe that some currently exist.468  By 
equating the regulations of the RRC with what can be imposed on groundwater, it is 
possible that the court intended for damages related to waste to be extended to 
groundwater in the same way they are used in oil and gas.469  Judging from Justice 
Hecht’s language in Sipriano, increased regulation is a more effective way to protect a 
resource than less regulation.470  Perhaps Day is the court’s avenue to create additional 
regulation, just as it had threatened to do in previous cases.    
 
While additional constraints on capture may be wise, simply extending correlative 
rights to groundwater by overlaying the definitions used in oil and gas creates challenges.  
The oil and gas regulatory regime has been well established since the early 1900s.471  
                                                 
463 See Elliff v. Texon Drilling Co., 210 S.W.2d 558, 583 (Tex. 1947). 
464 See id. 
465 See id. 
466 See Day, 369 S.W.3d at 832. 
467 See id. at 825–26. 
468 See id. 
469 See id. 
470 See Sipriano v. Great Spring Waters of Am., Inc., 1 S.W.3d 75, 82 (Tex. 1999) (Hecht, 
J., concurring). 
471 See Elliff v. Texon Drilling Co., 210 S.W.2d 558, 583 (Tex. 1947). 
 51
Meanwhile, the full suite of laws that govern groundwater were established through a 
piecemeal evolution beginning in 1904.472  While application of oil and gas rules in the 
groundwater context may have been a workable solution a hundred years ago, attempting 
to do it now only generates more questions than answers.   
 
In addition to legal challenges, there are many geologic and social differences as 
well. 473 Although both oil and water are located and move underground, unlike oil and 
gas deposits, most groundwater aquifers recharge, which can both help and hinder 
attempts to align regulations between the sectors. 474  Perhaps the most important 
distinctions are the social differences between the two substances.  Oil and gas, while 
definitely important economically, cannot match the social value of water.  Because of 
the constant and growing need for water, long-term goals will be different for each.  
Existing legislation in both sectors reflects these varying objectives.475  Throughout case 
law, the court recognized the need for water sustainability and stated that addition 
regulations were necessary, yet Day seemed to ignore those concerns.476  Despite the 
reasoning, both obvious and discreet, that led to the Day decision, courts will continue to 
answer questions as they arise, and the legislature will be forced to conform its 
regulations to this new definition of capture in hopes that Texas’s groundwater resources 
can be sustained into the future. 
 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
 
 Texas groundwater management has a long history of intertwined court decisions 
and legislation.  Although the common law rule of right of capture was established over 
100 years ago, the rule has been modified based on the conservation amendment to the 
Texas Constitution, which authorized the legislature to manage groundwater.  Court 
decisions regarding groundwater issues deferred to both the conservation amendment and 
subsequent legislative efforts to plan and manage groundwater.   
 
 The growth of the regional planning process paired with increased demand raised 
questions regarding when ownership began.  Courts never stated whether ownership was 
vested in place or if the water must first be captured.  This answer to this question was 
critical to understanding the extent to which regulations would be appropriate without a 
constitutional violation.  The Texas Supreme Court’s decision in Day provided the 
answer.  In that regulatory challenge, the court clearly stated that, like oil and gas, right of 
capture was synonymous with absolute ownership.  Consequently, regulations that 
exceeded the police power would be an unconstitutional taking. 
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 The Day opinion marked a divergence from previous groundwater case law.  
Although upholding capture was consistent, the court’s opinions towards capture and 
deference to the legislative efforts to cap pumping was distinctly different from prior 
opinions.  While past cases indicated that capture should be changed due to changing 
circumstances in the state, the Day court did not address this issue and instead aligned 
groundwater law with oil and gas.   
 
 There are three possible reasons why the Day court departed from precedent.  
First, the court may have been determining a property right, which was still within the 
authority of the court despite the constitutional amendment.  Even in instances when 
primary authority is placed with lawmakers, determination of certain common law 
principles are reserved by the court.  Second, the Day decision may have been another in 
a list of cases prioritizing private property rights.  Finally, by aligning groundwater with 
Texas oil and gas law, the court may have been attempting to extend correlative rights 
where they were not previously present.  In oil and gas law, absolute ownership of the 
minerals includes consideration of conservation and neighboring rights.  By defining the 
right in this way, regulations that seek to protect either or these are protected from a 
takings claim in most circumstances.  Although, correlative rights have not previous been 
present in groundwater law, perhaps they will be now.  
